Economic growth In the long run by Tamura, Robert et al.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Economic growth In the long run
Robert Tamura and Gerald P. Dwyer and John Devereux
and Scott Baier
Clemson University, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Queens
College, CUNY, Clemson University
14. September 2012
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/41324/
MPRA Paper No. 41324, posted 15. September 2012 21:02 UTC
Economic Growth in the Long Run∗
Robert Tamura, Jerry Dwyer, John Devereux, Scott Baier†
August 2012
Abstract
We present new data on real output per worker, schooling per worker, human capital per worker,
real physical capital per worker for 168 countries. The output data represent all available data from
Maddison. The physical capital data represent all available data from Mitchell. One major contribution
is a new set of human capital per worker, the foundation of which comes mostly from Mitchell. We
provide original estimates of schooling per worker & per young worker. With our preferred measure of
human capital, between 66 percent to 90 percent of all the variation in long run growth can be explained
by variation in the growth of inputs per worker, and only 10-34 percent from variation in TFP growth!
Furthermore between 66 percent and 80 percent of the variation in log levels can be explained by
variation in the log input levels and only 20 percent to 34 percent is explained by variation in log TFP
levels!
1 Introduction
Since 1820, which we will consider the beginning of the Industrial Revolution, the disparity in income
per capita has increased dramatically. In 1820, the Netherlands, with highest output per worker ($5500),
was 5 times richer than Myanmar, the country with the lowest output per worker ($1100).1 In 2007, the
top to bottom distance is between the United States ($76,000) and Zaire ($750), or a factor of 100!2 The
variance of the log of output per worker has increased from .39 in 1820 to 1.15. The primary objective of
this paper is to account for the factors that have resulted in the growth of output per worker as well as the
increase in dispersion output per worker. To this end, we use data from Maddison, Mitchell, and Lindert to
produce a data set that has measures of output per worker, physical capital, and human capital that covers
168 countries and covers the onset of the Industrial Revolution for every region of the world. Over this
long horizon, the growth in factors of production account for eighty percent of output per worker growth.
More striking, the variation in the growth rates of inputs can account for eighty percent of the variation
in the growth rate of output per worker! This is in marked contrast to previous work over shorter time
∗We thank Peter Klenow, Chad Jones, Kevin M. Murphy, Richard Rogerson, Todd Schoellman, Curtis Simon, Paula Tkac,
Kei-Mu Yi for helpful comments and suggestions. We also thank the seminar participants at the University of North Carolina
at Chapel Hill, 2009 NBER Time and Space Conference at the Philadelphia FRB, 2009 Midwest Macroeconomics Meetings at
Indiana University, Human Capital and Economic Development Conference at the Korean Labor Institute, Stanford University,
Osaka City University, Osaka University, ICU.
†Clemson University & Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Queens College of City
University of New York, Clemson University & Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta
1All values are expressed in 2000 PPP dollars.
2Luxembourg is the most productive country with output per worker of more than $160,000 in 2007, but we chose to go
with the second most productive country instead.
1
horizons that find that TFP growth variation is much more important in explaining output per worker
growth variation than input growth variation. For example Klenow & Rodriguez-Clare (1997) find less
than 20% of output growth variation is explained by input growth variation. Baier, Dwyer and Tamura
(2006), hereafter BDT, have a longer time series, but still find that barely 20% of output per worker growth
variation is explained by input per worker growth variation.
In this paper we develop a new data set, which dramatically expands the data available in BDT.
The number of countries is expanded from 145 to 168, but more importantly, the length of coverage for
all countries is dramatically increased. Further we have the growth of formal schooling in every region
from illiteracy to universal primary schooling, near universal secondary schooling and rising attendance in
higher education. Using a Bils-Klenow definition of human capital, we find that variation in growth rates
of output per worker is equally captured by variations in growth rates of inputs and variations in growth
rates of TFP. If one uses intergenerational human capital accumulation technology, most of average growth
in output per worker can be explained by the growth in real physical capital per worker and human capital
per worker. Furthermore we find that this intergenerational human capital accumulation specification can
help to explain even more of the variation in growth rates across countries. Specifically we find that the new
human capital model can explain between 66 percent to 90 percent of growth variations across countries.
Additionally most of log level differences, between 66 percent and 80 percent, are explained by log level
differences in inputs, rather than differences in log TFP. Both of these findings strongly support the ability
of intergenerational human capital accumulation models to explain long run growth differences, and long
run development differences.
One important caveat to bear in mind. We take the time path of input accumulation, physical capital
and human capital as given. In particular we think that high quality institutions matter a great deal in
providing both a higher return on existing inputs, more output per worker, as well as greater incentives
to accumulate. To the degree that inputs explain output per worker differences at a point in time, and
differential growth rates of inputs explain differential output per worker growth rates, then institutions
can be primary. The list of contributors to this line of research is large, but certainly includes: Acemoglu,
Johnson and Robinson (2001,2002, 2005a,b), Canaday and Tamura (2009), Gwartney and Lawson (2008),
Keefer and Knack (1997a,b), Kormendi and Meguire (1985), North (1981, 1990), Parente and Prescott
(1994, 1999, 2002) and Tamura, Simon and Murphy (2012).
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we give a brief overview of the data used in the
paper. The interested reader can read our companion Data Appendix (2011) for more details. Section
3 contains the growth accounting. Section 4 contains our variance decomposition of growth. We use
three different measures of input importance for capturing disparate economic performance. We present
intergenerational human capital in Section 5, with and without spillovers. Section 6 examines the robustness
of our conclusions. Evidence from micro data is presented in Section 7. Section 8 concludes.
2 Data
We use Maddison for data on real PPP per capita output.3 All values are in real 2000 dollars. We use
Mitchell (2003a,b,c) for historical data on labor force.4 For investment rates in physical capital we used
3Data was taken from his personal website: http://www.ggdc.net/maddison. Also we used the growth rate of PPP output
per capita from 2006 to 2007 from World Development Report 2009 to produce our 2007 value.
4See our Data Appendix (2011) for greater detail. For 2007 labor force we used the World Development Indicators.
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both Mitchell (2003a,b,c) for historical values as well as Summers, Heston and Aten (2009).5 From these
base data we produce measures of PPP real output per worker. We use the standard perpetual inventory
method to produce real physical capital per worker.6
For human capital, we first produce original estimates of schooling for each country by age cohort as
well as the average schooling in the labor force.7 This is an original contribution to the literature as prior
to this the earliest measures of years of schooling are contained in Baier, Dwyer and Tamura (2006). To
compute our initial human capital, we use the same method as in Baier, Dwyer and Tamura (2006), Hall &
Jones (1999) and Klenow & Rodriguez-Clare (1997). We use cross sectional evidence from labor economists
to compute human capital as a function of schooling and experience.8
ht = exp(f(schooling) + g(experience)) (1)
f(E) = .10E (2)
g(experience) = .0495experience− .0007experience2 (3)
Notice that if all countries have reached the same schooling level, as well as the same average experience,
then all countries will have the same human capital.9 This implies that human capital is bounded by the
level of schooling and experience. Since schooling cannot grow without bound, then eventually growth
will cease, unless technological progress induces factor accumulation. Furthermore this convergence result
predicts very rapid convergence in levels of income across countries as their schooling levels become more
similar. Both of these assumptions will be relaxed in later sections in order to better explain the distribution
of income across the countries of the world.
If, however countries permanent differences in the level of schooling, then there would be permanent
differences in human capital input. Consider two countries, one with 13.6 years of schooling and the other
with 1.4 years of schooling.10 Ignoring the experience term, the relative amount of human capital in these
countries would be given by:
h(13.8)
h(1.4)
= exp(.1[13.6− 1.4]) = exp(1.2) (4)
5We used overlapping year observations to produce PPP real investment rates for years not covered in Summers, Heston
and Aten (2009). See our Data Appendix (2011) for greater detail.
6One major change between this data and that in Baier, Dwyer and Tamura (2006) is in the treatment of physical capital
depreciation. In the earlier paper used a 7% annual depreciation rate. This produced implausibly small capital-output ratios,
typically less than 2. In this paper we used a range of depreciation rates, which rise with the level of output per worker. The
range for depreciation rates is 3% to 5%. For a commonly assumed capital output ratio of 3, a 5% depreciation rate produces
a depreciation charge against output of 15% of output, which is at the high end of rates used in public finance. With the
lower depreciation rates, this paper produces much more plausible capital-output ratios. See our Data Appendix (2011) for
more detail.
7We use enrollments in schooling for all years that are available in Mitchell’s three volume set, as well as modern day
sources like Human Development Reports and World Development Reports. In addition we use literacy information contained
in Morris and Adelman (1988) and Steckel and Floud (1997). We follow the rule that it takes three years to become literate,
so if 20 percent of the adult population is literate, we assume that 20 percent of the population attended school for 3 years,
producing a measured schooling level of 0.6 years in the population. For more on the details of the computation of schooling
in the labor force see our companion data appendix, Data Appendix for Economic Growth in the Long Run.
8One big difference is that unlike Hall & Jones and Klenow & Rodriguez-Clare, we do not assume decreasing returns to
additional years of schooling. In Turner, Tamura, Mulholland and Baier (2007) there was little evidence of decreasing returns
to schooling over the 160 years of US state data. Thus the human capital input in high schooling countries will be higher and
TFP correspondingly lower than their counterparts computed in Hall & Jones and Klenow & Rodriguez-Clare.
9The choice of parameters on experience returns reflects two points, (1) that the returns per year of experience starts at
.0495 and peak earnings occurs at 33.5 years of experience
10These are the 2007 values of the second most educated country, United States, and the least educated country, Bhutan.
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With perfect physical capital mobility, and no difference in technology levels, the model would predict that
the higher schooling country would be 3.4 times as productive per worker than the lower schooling country.
The gap between the US and Bhutan in 2007 is about 11, $76,000 vs. $7000. Human capital measured in
this way explains only about one-third of the gap in output per worker.
We summarize the data in graphical form in the following four graphs. We present regional average
real output per worker, regional average real physical capital per worker, regional average schooling per
worker, regional average human capital and regional average TFP. In computing these regional averages
we depart from BDT and present the population weighted values for each region. We keep a region as
long as the existing countries represent at least 50 percent of the labor force in 2007.11 Unlike BDT where
the graphs represent the regional average growth rates, these figures allow for effects of changing country
composition. Thus the changing sample as countries appear in the data, as time moves forward, can change
regional average levels if their initially observed real output per worker (real physical capital per worker,
schooling per worker, TFP) differ from the regional average. However with the extension of data, many
regions are dominated by countries that appear all at once, say 1820. Regions that have almost complete
coverage in 1820 include: Western Countries, Southern Europe, NIC, Asia and North Africa. In the case
of the Western Countries, we observe France, Germany, Netherlands, Sweden, UK and the United States
by 1800.12 These six countries constitute 83 percent of the labor force in 2007. The five countries of the
Southern Europe region observed in 1820 contain more than 99 percent of the labor force in 2007. All of
the NIC countries are observed in 1820. In the Asia region, we observe eight countries in 1820. These
include China, India, Indonesia, Thailand. All eight of these countries constitute 87 percent of the labor
force in 2007. Of the five countries in North Africa, four are observed in 1820. These constitute 96 percent
of the labor force in 2007.
Figure 1 below contains the regional average real output per worker. The Western Countries region
have been home to the world’s highest output per worker countries for nearly the last two centuries. In
1820 real output per worker in Western Countries was 42 percent higher than in Southern Europe, almost
double NIC, more than double Asia, and more than 2.5 times higher than workers in North Africa. Fifty
years later, workers in Western Countries were more than twice as productive as their counterparts in
Southern Europe and NIC, more than three times as productive as those in North Africa and four times
more productive than workers in Asia. Whereas real output per worker grew in every region except Asia,
it is clear that the Industrial Revolution begins with Western Countries. Just before the onset of World
War I, workers in Western Countries are twice as productive as their counterparts in Southern Europe,
more than three times as productive as those in NIC, six times those of Asia, four times those in North
Africa. It appears that the Industrial Revolution diffused to Southern Europe and the NIC by 1910, which
kept the relative productivity gap constant. However Asia and North Africa lag further behind. World
War II induced divergence between the Western Countries and the rest of the world, despite damage to
the France, UK, and Germany. Since 1950 there is evidence of conditional convergence.
Figure 2 below contains the regional average real physical capital per worker. Physical capital mirrors
real output per worker, with the exception of the dramatic declines arising from World War I and II in
Western Countries, and World War II for the NIC.13
Figure 3 below contains the regional average schooling per worker. If one takes 3 years of schooling as
11For all regions except for the Western Countries and Sub-Saharan Africa, this is 1820. For the Western Countries their
first observation is 1800. For Sub-Saharan Africa we chose to include it all the way back to 1820, even though it is only South
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Figure 1: Real Output Per Worker: by Region
sufficient to provide basic literacy, then one observes literacy in the average worker of Western Countries
occurred in 1850. Literacy of the typical worker outside of this region happened much later: 1920 Southern
Europe, 1930 Central & Eastern Europe, 1910 NIC, 1965 Asia, 1977 Sub-Saharan Africa, 1950 Latin Amer-
ica, 1972 Middle East, and 1970 North Africa. Thus the regions that behaved most like Western Countries,
Southern Europe, Central & Eastern Europe, and NIC, attained literate work forces no later than 80 years
after Western Countries’ attainment. Those that lagged behind took at least a century or more to educate
their workers.
This can be seen in Figure 4, where we graph the average years of schooling of the youngest worker
cohort, by region. Young workers were literate in Western Countries by 1830, followed by young Southern
Europe workers a half century later, 1880. Young workers of Central & Eastern Europe did not attain
literacy until 1905. The young workers of NIC became literate by 1895. Young workers in Asia became
literate by 1950, soon after World War II. The typical young Sub-Saharan African worker did not attain
basic literacy until 1965. Youngsters of Latin America were literate by 1930, but their Middle East brethren
did not become literate until 1960. Young workers of North Africa were literate by 1955.
Using the Klenow & Rodriguez-Clare (1997), Hall and Jones (1999) method for computing human
capital based on schooling and average experience we construct human capital by region. These are
Africa. In 1870 we observe Ghana as well, for all other countries in this region we seen them at the earliest 1950.
12We observe the UK in 1801.
13This is by construction. We increased depreciation rates of physical capital during the war years to take into account
explicit destruction as a consequence of the War, e.g. Germany and UK, or due to reduced maintenance, e.g. Australia,
Canada and the US. For more details see our data appendix.
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Figure 2: Real Physical Capital Per Worker: by Region
presented in Figure 5. Since 1950 there has been convergence in human capital, whereas prior to 1950
there appears to have been divergence.14
Assuming a Cobb-Douglas aggregate production function, with physical capital share of .33, figure 6
contains the regional average TFP. The results are consistent with those found earlier in BDT. As before
Western Countries have been the world leader in TFP, although since 1950 the NIC and Southern Europe
have converged. These regions aside, however, there appears to be a slight tendency of divergence in the
world. As the scale is logarithmic, the vertical distances, and hence proportional gaps, between regions
appears to be slowly increasing. In fact in 1820 the gap between the top region and the bottom region was
almost 3 to 1, 96 to 33. In 2007 the gap between top and bottom is almost 4 to 1, 313 to 80. In fact even
excluding Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa, the gap between the top and bottom regions in 1820 is
about 2 to 1, 96 to 50, but in 2007 it is about 2.5 to 1, 312 to 127.
14The NIC appears to have been an exception, with convergence since 1870.
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Figure 3: Education Per Worker: by Region
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Figure 4: Education Per Young Worker: by Region
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Figure 5: Human Capital Per Worker, Base: by Region
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Figure 6: Total Factor Productivity, Base: by Region
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3 Growth Accounting
Here we report the results of the growth accounting from the new data. We summarize the data in
three ways. The first way weights the data by the 2007 population multiplied by the number of years of
observation; we call this the population-duration estimates. The second method weights each country by
their 2007 population. The final method treats every country equally. In earlier works, like Klenow &
Rodriguez-Clare (1997), each country’s growth rates are equally weighted. In data sets where all countries
are observed over the same time period this makes some sense. However it does have the disadvantage of
equally weighting economic performance achieved in a country like China, with over one billion people, the
same as a country with less than one million people, like Fiji. In addition if the number of years a country
is observed differs greatly, then a country that achieves annualized growth rate of 1.2% for 150 years is
treated the same as a country which manages annualized 1.2% growth for 20 years. In the former living
standards are 6 times their initial value, whereas in the latter case living standards are barely 27% higher
than the initial observation.
For any country i, we assume a standard Cobb-Douglas production technology, combining physical
capital per worker, Kit, and human capital per worker, Hit, to produce output per worker, Yit:
Yit = AitKαitH
1−α
it , (5)
where α = .33, similar to that found in Gollin (2002), and used by Caselli (2005). In the first third of
Table 1 we present the population-duration weighted results. The middle third of the table weights each
country’s observation by their 2007 population, and the final third of the table is unweighted. For the
population-duration weighted results, real output per worker growth is 1.17% per year, with real input
per worker growth of 0.72% per year.15 Input growth explains 61 percent of output per worker growth,
with a range of 57% for Asia to 80% for Sub-Saharan Africa. Real output per worker growth is quite
homogeneous across regions. Whereas in the unweighted case, real output per worker growth ranged from
a low of 0.86% per year in Central & Eastern Europe to a high of 2.55% per year in Southern Europe, in the
population-duration case, the range of real output per worker growth is 0.96% per year to 1.81% per year.
Overall in both weighted cases, all regions have positive TFP growth, and in the unweighted case only one
region, Central and Eastern Europe, has negative TFP growth. In the weighted cases, TFP growth ranges
between 0.12% per year in Central and Eastern Europe to 0.63% per year in NIC. The population weighted
results are very similar to the population-duration weights results.
In the unweighted case, the worker in the typical country had annualized growth rates of 1.34% for
output, 1.05% for inputs, and 0.29% for TFP. In contrast, in BDT, the worker in the typical country had
annualized growth rates of 0.74% for output, 1.55% for inputs, and −0.81% for TFP. A comparison of the
different regions shows that all regions now have positive economic growth. They range from a high of
2.55% per year real output growth in Southern Europe to a low of 0.86% per year in Central & Eastern
Europe. Only one region, the Middle East, has negative TFP growth.16
15Letting α be capital’s share in production, the total growth rate of inputs is αgk + (1− α)gh.
16In the unweighted results of BDT, one region had negative real output per worker growth, Central & Eastern Europe,
and 5 regions had negative TFP growth rates, Central & Eastern Europe, Asia, Middle East, Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin
America. With new data per worker output growth increased. Central & Eastern Europe moves from −0.84% to 0.86%.
Asia goes from 1.05% to 1.49%. Middle East countries go from 0.09% to 0.99%. Sub-Saharan Africa growth increases from
0.17% to 1.32%. Latin America has almost no change between BDT, 1.23%, and here, 1.24%. However TFP growth has
moved from −.29% in BDT to .23% here.
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Table 1: Growth Accounting
Annualized Growth Rates
Region N gy gk ghc gx gz sharegx sharegz
Population-Duration Weights
World 168 1.17% 1.11% 0.53% 0.72% 0.46% 0.611 0.389
(WC) Western Countries 18 1.45 1.56 0.60 0.92 0.54 0.631 0.369
(SE) Southern Europe 7 1.45 1.56 0.59 0.91 0.54 0.630 0.370
(CEE) Central and Eastern Europe 24 1.28 1.26 0.72 0.89 0.38 0.699 0.301
(NIC) Newly Industrialized Countries 5 1.81 2.36 0.59 1.18 0.63 0.652 0.348
(Asia) Asia 20 1.05 0.89 0.45 0.60 0.45 0.572 0.428
(SSA) Sub-Saharan Africa 48 1.06 1.10 0.77 0.85 0.21 0.805 0.195
(LA) Latin America 28 1.19 1.02 0.60 0.75 0.45 0.626 0.374
(ME) Middle East 13 1.17 1.08 0.58 0.68 0.49 0.584 0.416
(NA) North Africa 5 1.17 1.13 0.51 0.70 0.47 0.598 0.402
Population Weights
World 168 1.18% 1.17% 0.58% 0.77% 0.41% 0.651 0.349
WC 18 1.46 1.57 0.60 0.92 0.54 0.630 0.370
SE 7 1.47 1.59 0.59 0.92 0.54 0.630 0.370
CEE 24 0.96 1.15 0.72 0.85 0.12 0.880 0.120
NIC 5 1.81 2.36 0.59 1.18 0.63 0.652 0.348
Asia 20 1.12 1.02 0.49 0.67 0.46 0.592 0.408
SSA 48 1.03 1.14 0.81 0.89 0.14 0.863 0.137
LA 28 1.19 1.04 0.65 0.79 0.41 0.659 0.341
ME 13 1.39 1.42 0.75 0.89 0.34 0.637 0.363
NA 5 1.18 1.16 0.54 0.72 0.46 0.612 0.388
Unweighted
World 168 1.34% 1.62% 0.79% 1.05% 0.29% 0.782 0.218
WC 18 1.69 1.95 0.59 1.04 0.65 0.615 0.385
SE 7 2.55 3.37 0.75 1.63 0.93 0.637 0.363
CEE 24 0.86 1.15 0.76 0.87 -0.01 1.010 -0.010
NIC 5 1.87 2.43 0.55 1.18 0.70 0.629 0.371
Asia 20 1.49 1.92 0.71 1.11 0.38 0.746 0.254
SSA 48 1.32 1.57 0.88 1.10 0.22 0.832 0.168
LA 28 1.24 1.38 0.83 1.02 0.23 0.818 0.182
ME 13 0.99 1.16 0.96 0.88 0.11 0.889 0.111
NA 5 1.24 1.40 0.73 0.88 0.36 0.709 0.291
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4 Variance Decomposition
In this section we present the results of the variance decomposition of growth rates. We construct
plausible upper bounds on the share of real output per worker growth variance explained by variations in
real input growth rates and variations in TFP growth rates. We proceed as in BDT (2006). We aggregate
inputs, physical capital per worker and human capital per worker, into the single measure Xt. Thus output
per worker is given as:
Xt = Kαt H
1−α
t (6)
Yt = ZtXt (7)
Taking logs and using gs represent growth rate of s produces:
gy = gz + gx (8)
Although our countries all are observed in 2007, some we observe as early as 1800, others as late as 1990.17
However the log difference between the 2007 observation and the first observation of the country divided
by the number of years between first and last observation produces estimates of annualized growth rates of
output per worker for all countries. The variance of the annual growth rate of output per worker across
these countries is given by:
σ2gy = σ
2
gz + 2σgx,gz + σ
2
gx (9)
Now it is standard in much of the empirical growth and development literature to allocate one-half of
the covariance terms to the inputs and one-half of the covariance terms to the residual, TFP, term, see
Klenow & Rodriguez-Clare (1997), Caselli (2005), Weil (2009). This “egalitarian” assignment is then
used to discuss the proportion of the variance of annual growth rates in output per worker “explained” or
“accounted” for by inputs and the remainder allocated to TFP. This assignment implies can also be written
as:
σ2gy = σgx,gy + σgz,gy (10)
1 =
σgx,gy
σ2gy
+
σgz,gy
σ2gy
(11)
Klenow & Rodriguez-Clare (1997) also argue that a better way to think about the contributions of input
growth and TFP growth is to only credit variations in the growth rate of capital intensity to inputs. We
modify this slightly by crediting human capital growth rates as not being induced by TFP growth rates,
but acknowledge that growth rates of physical capital could be induced by TFP growth rates. Thus rewrite
17Recall that East Germany is only observed from 1950-1990.
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the output equation as:
Yt = (
Kt
Yt
)
α
1−αZ
α
1−α
t Ht (12)
Yt = ZˆtXˆt (13)
Xˆt = (
Kt
Yt
)
α
1−αHt (14)
Zˆt = Z
α
1−α
t (15)
Proceeding as before we can compute the growth rates of output per worker, and the new inputs per worker
and TFP and produce:
σ2gy = σgxˆ,gy + σgzˆ,gy (16)
1 =
σgxˆ,gy
σ2gy
+
σgzˆ,gy
σ2gy
(17)
These two variance decomposition methods proposed by Klenow & Rodriguez-Clare (1997) arise from
priors as to the causal link of the correlation of growth rates of inputs and TFP. Under (11) the proportion
of growth rate variations that co-vary with input (TFP) growth variations is assigned to inputs (TFP).
Under (11) a priori TFP growth variations induce physical capital growth rate variations, and only physical
capital intensity growth rate variations are ascribed to inputs. Further it is assumed in (11) that human
capital growth rate variations are not induced by TFP growth rate variations.18
Returning to the original variance decomposition and dividing by the variance of growth rate of output
per worker also produces:
1 =
σ2gz
σ2gy
+
σ2gx
σ2gy
+ 2ρx,z
σgxσgz
σ2gy
(18)
However as noted above the correlation of growth rates of inputs and total factor productivity growth is
not 0. There are two sets of theories that explain the correlation between input growth and TFP growth.
The exogenous technological growth neoclassical growth model implies that factor accumulation is induced
by the growth in TFP. Additionally Romer (1990) has the same implication that endogenous technological
progress drives all capital accumulation and growth in the economy. At the other end, Romer (1986),
Lucas (1988), and Tamura (2002,2006) construct theories in which physical capital accumulation or human
capital accumulation induces endogenous TFP growth. These theories imply that the correlation between
TFP growth and input growth are due to input growth and hence the correlated or predictable component
should be assigned to input growth.
If TFP growth induces factor accumulation, then the predictable or correlated portion of input growth
should be assigned to TFP growth, the share of growth of output per worker variation can be written as:
1 =
(σgz + σgxρgx,gz )
2
σ2gy
+
(1− ρ2gx,gz )σ2gx
σ2gy
(19)
where the first term is now a plausible upper bound on the proportion of the variation in growth rates of
18in Klenow & Rodriguez-Clare (1997) they also assume that human capital growth rates maybe induced by TFP growth
rates, and hence only capital intensity, inclusive of both physical capital intensity and human capital intensity are varying
“independently” from TFP growth rate variations.
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output per worker caused by variation in growth rates of TFP.19 If the predictable or correlated component
of TFP growth arises from endogenous factor accumulation, then assigning this predictable component to
factor accumulation produces the following variance decomposition:
1 =
(σgx + σgzρgx,gz )
2
σ2gy
+
(1− ρ2gx,gz )σ2gz
σ2gy
(20)
The first term is now the proportion of the variation of growth rates of output per worker that is explained
by variation in input growth.20 Since it is not obvious which of the theories is true, we propose to let the
data guide us. We construct the average of the contributions for inputs and TFP and compare them with
the other decompositions. Thus we produce the average BDT decompositions as:
Sgx =
σ2gx
σ2gy
+
1
2
ρ2gx,gz
(
σ2gz − σ2gx
)
σ2gy
+
σgxσgzρgx,gz
σ2gy
(21)
Sgz =
σ2gz
σ2gy
+
1
2
ρ2gx,gz
(
σ2gx − σ2gz
)
σ2gy
+
σgxσgzρgx,gz
σ2gy
(22)
The results of these three bounds, (10), (16), (20)-(21), are contained in Table 2.21 Columns (1) and (2)
present the relative importance based on covariance shares of input growth rates and TFP growth rates.
Columns (3) and (4) contain the covariance shares of relative input intensity growth rates and TFP growth
rates. Columns (5) and (6) contain the shares from the average BDT decomposition. We also report the
average BDT decomposition, but using the BDT data. Comparing the results for all countries, there is a
big increase in explanatory power contained in input growth variation compared with BDT and Klenow
& Rodriguez-Clare (1997). The increase in years of coverage as well the increase in number of countries
observed, results in a substantial rise in the input share of growth rate variation. Whereas only 22% of
growth rate variation is explained using the BDT average decomposition before, column (7), now half of
output growth rate variation is explained by input growth variation. Using the Klenow &Rodriguez-Clare
covariance share, produces a similar 46% explanatory share for input growth rate variations. Only the
more restrictive covariance share of physical capital intensity variations lowers the explanatory power of
input growth rate variations, 19%. Still this is a sharp increase from the 3% share found by Klenow &
Rodriguez-Clare.
19One way of seeing that the least squares decomposition holds for this representation is to note that the variance decom-
position is var(y) = β2y,avar(a) + var(ey|a), where βy,a is the regression coefficient from a regression of y on a and ey|a is the
regression residual.
20One way of seeing that the least squares decomposition holds for this representation is to note that the variance decom-
position is var(y) = β2y,xvar(x) + var(ey|x), where βy,x is the regression coefficient from a regression of y on x and ey|x is the
regression residual.
21See Table A2 in the Appendix in which both (18) and (19) are presented. All of these calculations assumes that the
correlation between growth of inputs and growth of TFP is positive. A negative correlation has several possible explanations.
One that does not make economic sense is forgetting. While it is possible to forget technology, and it has happened to
peoples in Europe after the fall of the Roman Empire, as well in China after the fall of the Qin Empire and the rise of the Han
Empire, over the 1800-2007 period there is much less of sense of forgetting. It is possible that the conversion of economies
toward central planning after World War II in Central and Eastern Europe and the switch back from central planning to
market based economies after the fall of the Soviet Union can be captured as forgetting. Communist collectivization and rising
capital accumulation would more likely than not produce falling TFP, e.g. Maoist China. Centrally planned accumulation of
inputs that have extremely low returns, building zero value public roads, investing in “critical” private sector industries that
no profit making investor would ever authorize, spending on “education,” but failing to provide the basics such as textbooks,
blackboard an chalk, qualified teachers, etc. All of these would be measured as productive factor accumulations, that have
0 or possibly negative returns. Of course institutional change that reduces property rights, that fosters corruption, etc. can
produce large negative TFP shocks.
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Table 2: Growth Variance Decomposition: Plausible Shares
Region N σgx,gyσ2gy
σgz,gy
σ2gy
σgxˆ,gy
σ2gy
σgzˆ,gy
σ2gy
Sgx Sgz BDTgx BDTgz
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
World 168 .460 .540 .194 .806 .500 .500 .22 .78
WC 18 .621 .379 .435 .565 .535 .465 .46 .54
SE 7 .659 .341 .492 .508 .502 .498 .50 .50
CEE 24 .353 .647 .034 .966 .412 .588 .28 .72
NIC 5 .201 .799 -.193 1.193 .283 .717 .64 .36
Asia 20 .494 .506 .245 .755 .499 .501 .40 .60
SSA 48 .528 .472 .296 .704 .517 .483 .37 .63
LA 28 .478 .522 .221 .779 .496 .504 .22 .78
ME 13 .343 .657 .019 .981 .528 .472 .44 .56
ME not OPEC 4 .617 .383 .428 .572 .601 .399
ME OPEC 9 .326 .674 -.006 1.006 .524 .476
NA 5 2.605 -1.605 3.395 -2.395 .608 .392 .84 .16
larger regions
(1): WC & SE 25 .655 .345 .485 .515 .512 .488
(2): (1) & NIC 30 .653 .347 .483 .517 .513 .487
(3): (2) & NA 35 .643 .357 .467 .533 .580 .420
(4); (3) & SSA 83 .541 .459 .315 .685 .526 .474
(5): (4) & Asia 103 .530 .470 .299 .701 .520 .480
(6); (5) & CEE 127 .484 .516 .230 .770 .493 .507
(7): (6) & LA 155 .484 .516 .229 .771 .492 .508
(8): (7) & ME
not OPEC
159 .485 .515 .232 .768 .494 .506
The rising input share is broad based, encompassing all regions, except for Southern Europe, NIC and
North Africa. In comparison to previous work, e.g. Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997), there is a marked
increased input share of cross sectional variation in growth. However there is still much left unexplained,
and to that we now turn.
5 New Human Capital Calculation
One conclusion from above is that despite adding many additional years of observations, and a nontriv-
ial number of new countries, output per worker growth rate variation is equally captured by TFP growth
rate variation (average BDT decomposition or covariance decomposition), or mostly captured by TFP
growth rate variation (Klenow & Rodriguez-Clare capital intensity input). To see how robust TFP growth
differences are for explaining differential growth, we return to some theories of endogenous growth. In
particular we examine the role of human capital accumulation in promoting growth of output per worker.
The original Lucas (1988), and Becker, Murphy and Tamura (1990) papers introduce the idea that time
spent away from production can be used to accumulate human capital. In Lucas infinite lived agents
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perpetually accumulate human capital, whereas in Becker, Murphy and Tamura parents spend time away
from production and educate their children. In both of these models human capital builds off of the exist-
ing human capital, hence accumulation has the property of standing on the shoulders of others. Allowing
for human capital spillovers across borders as in Tamura (1991, 1996, 2002, 2006) produces the following
specification for country i between generations t and t+ 1:
hit+1 = Ah
ρ
th
β
it exp(f(schooling) + g(experience)) (23)
where hit represents the human capital of the parent, ht represents the frontier human capital in the world,
ρ is the degree to which the frontier human capital can be diffused, taught to the children, and the two
functions, f and g in the exponential are defined as in (2) and (3), 0 < ρ, β < 1, ρ + β ≤ 1.22 The key
innovation here is that we allow for intergenerational accumulation in human capital.23 We initialized 15-24
year old human capital in a country using information on the output per worker relative to the US and
human capital relative to the US using Schoellman (2012).24 The virtues of this method are twofold:
(1) it allows for human capital across generations to accumulate, while allowing for the possibility of late
developers to converge to the human capital level of early developers via the spillover effect, (2) it keeps a
demographic age structure of human capital in the population that incorporates the Mincer age earnings
quadratic profile. That is to say, if we compare individuals in a country of the same age, but different
schooling levels, their earnings would differ by exp(f(schooling) + g(experience)) and be consistent with
Mincerian wage regressions on returns to schooling. Second if we compare individuals in a country over
their life cycle, their human capital has the standard inverted U-shape age earnings profile consistent with
Mincerian wage regressions. Now consider the ability of this specification to capture differences in long
run human capital levels. First assume that there is no spillover, i.e. ρ = 0. Consider two economies, one
where each generation attains 14.5 years of schooling, and one where each generation attains only 1.4 years
of schooling, this is equal to the 2007 gap between the least schooled country, Bhutan, and the schooling of
the young workers in the United States. Ignoring experience returns, the stationary human capital values
22If ρ+β = 1, then perpetual endogenous growth is possible; this formulation is used in Tamura, Simon and Murphy (2011)
examining human capital convergence across states and races in the US from 1840 to 2000. If ρ+ β < 1, then a steady state
human capital level exists, once schooling becomes constant. Either technological progress in output production, or rising A
would be required for perpetual growth. One possibility for rising A would be if A grew as a function of those enrolled in
higher education. These would be consistent with Jones (1995a,1995b, 2001).
23This is similar to the specification in Bils and Klenow (2000), although in their model they do not allow for spillovers
across countries.
24We did not follow an explicit rule in that we allowed some deviations. A brief description of our assignment methodology
is as follows. We construct initial output per worker relative to the US output per worker in the comparable decade. Let
E15−24it be the 15 to 24 year old cohort’s education in initial year t in country i. Let E
15−24
USt be the 15 to 24 year old US
cohort’s education in year t. Schoellman (2012) finds that a very good approximation to human capital adjusting for school
quality differences is simply given by exp(.2*years of schooling). Thus using Schoellman (2012) we construct initial relative
young human capital as exp(.2 ∗ [E15−24it − E15−24iUS ]). Our initial young human capital for country i in year t relative to the
US is well described by a log linear regression on log relative output per worker, log relative human capital from Schoellman
(given above), region dummies and a few other region or country variables. Table A1 in the Appendix lists the initial human
capital for workers age 15-24 and the initial average human capital for each country, as well as the 2007 values. See section
1.3 of our data appendix for full details.
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of these respective countries are given by:
h(14.5) = A
1
1−β exp(
1.45
1− β ) (24)
h(1.4) = A
1
1−β exp(
.14
1− β ) (25)
h(14.5)
h(1.4)
= exp(
1.31
1− β ) (26)
Compared to the human capital specification without intergenerational human capital accumulation, this
specification accentuates permanent differences in schooling. For a value of β = .35, the model delivers
a 7.5 relative human capital gap between these two countries, almost 70% of the 2007 income difference
between the US ($76,000) and Bhutan ($7000)! Without intergenerational human capital the human capital
gap between these two countries would be 3.7 or about 35% of the income difference between the US and
Bhutan.
The human capital in the economy is therefore a population weighted average of human capital of 5 age
groups, 15-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55-64. Thus human capital in country i in year t is:
Hit = s15−24,th15−24,t + s25−34,th25−34,t + s35−44,th35−44,t + s45−54,th45−54,t + s55−64,th55−64,t (27)
where si is the share of the population in age category i, and human capital accumulates via the age
earnings profile from above, for example:
h35−44,t+1 = h25−34,t exp(g(experience+10)− g(experience)) (28)
where each generation is assumed to have an average schooling and hence their first set of expected expe-
rience in the age group 15-24 is given by:
experience15−24 = max(0, average age - 6 - average schooling) (29)
and from then on, every observation they age 10 years.25 For the new generation, represented by h15−24 we
assume that the parents are between the ages of 35-54 today. That is to say we use the arithmetic average
human capital of adults 25-34 and 35-44 in the prior observation to produce human capital for current
15-24 children. This assumes parents had their children between the ages of 20-39. Our intergenerational
25In terms of the human capital of Central and Eastern Europe we generally kept their schooling human capital attained
prior to the fall of the communist system using this method of experience returns. However after 1989 we eliminated all
human capital accumulation from experience, and restarted their experience measure at 0 in year 1990. We do this to capture
the shock of a completely new system of production, mixed or market based, and the complete depreciation of experience
arising from life under the communist system.
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human capital accumulation equation is:
h15−24,t = Ah
ρ
t−1
(
h25−34,t−1 + h35−44,t−1
2
)β
exp(f(schooling) + g(experience)) (30)
where, β = .35, A=.50, f(schooling) and g(experience) are given by (2) and (3), where initial experience is
max(0,average age - 6 - expected schooling of cohort born in period t-1). Our choice of the value of β and A
come after conducting a grid search of values from β = .05 to β = .8, and from .25 to .65 for A. Interestingly
our β = .35 is midpoint of the estimates of the intergenerational elasticity of parental contributions to child
human capital found in Table 4 of Lefgren, Lindquist and Sims (2012).26 In these calculations the time
subscripts refer to birth cohort, and typically are spaced 10 years apart. Thus for the US where birth
cohorts are exactly 10 years apart until the last one in 2007, the human capital of 15-24 year olds in 1860
use the school enrollment rates in 1850 to produce an estimate of expected years of schooling.
We first assumed no spillover in the human capital accumulation function, i.e. ρ = 0. Figures 7 and
8 present the regional graphs of human capital per worker and TFP. In both figures we computed the
average human capital and TFP weighting by the population. There is more rapid growth in human
capital and a consequent slower growth in TFP as a result. The results of the growth accounting and
variance decomposition of growth rates are contained in Tables 3 and 4. There is little change in the share
of overall growth explained by input growth. However this masks the changes across regions. All regions
except for Central & Eastern Europe, Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa have rising shares from input growth.
The declining shares from the three regions above essentially exactly offset the rising shares in all other
regions. In contrast, Table 4 indicates the value of introducing parental human capital into human capital
accumulation.
Whereas Table 2 shows that variation in input growth explains about 50 percent of the variation in
output per worker growth, the introduction intergenerational accumulation raises the share of input growth
rate variation to about three-fourths, using either the covariance share or the average BDT decomposition!
The increase is broad based; eight of nine regions have higher shares of growth rate variation captured
by input growth rate variation, when comparing average BDT decompositions.27 The share of growth
rate variation arising from input growth rate variation under the more restrictive physical capital intensity
input exceeds three-fifths!28 Recall that Klenow & Rodriguez-Clare find only 10% input share under
this specification. Using the Klenow & Rodriguez-Clare covariance share of input growth rates, eight
regions increase compared to the simple Mincer cross section human capital measure.29 When we look at
larger regions, the rising ability of input growth variations to explain output per worker growth variations
26We report on the robustness of our results in a later section.
27The ninth region, North Africa, remains constant at 84% share, but this is an increase when compared with a 61% share
under the Mincer cross section returns human capital definition.
28All regions show dramatic improvements, except for North Africa which goes from 340% share to 35% share.
29North Africa falls from 260% share to 56% share.
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Figure 7: Human Capital Per Worker, β = .35, ρ = 0: by Region
continues and in fact becomes larger. About 70% of growth rate variations are captured by input growth
rate variations for Western Countries, Southern Europe, NIC and North Africa contrasted with 58% in the
model without intergenerational human capital accumulation. By the end, when all countries except for
OPEC countries of the Middle East are included, over 75% of the growth variation is explained by input
growth variation compared with 50% in the model without intergenerational human capital. We find that
input growth variation is more important than TFP growth variation.
5.1 Spillovers
The previous sub-section showed that intergenerational links between parents and children improve our
understanding of growth differences. In this section we examine the role of international spillovers to
explain cross country growth differences. In other words, what is left to do is to find reasonable values for
ρ, the spillover, the determination of h. We assume that human capital spillover arises from the maximum
human capital country, which is the US. 30 The importance of this human capital spillover is dependent on
the schooling of the population. As a country becomes more educated, it can better draw on the body of
knowledge in the world. This is similar to Tamura (1996, 2002, 2006), but instead of a step function, we
30The US certainly led the world in universal secondary schooling, c.f. Goldin (2001) and Goldin and Katz (2008), and
tertiary schooling. A few countries have observed primary school enrollment rates higher than the US in the first third of the
nineteenth century, e.g. Netherlands, however literacy was quite high in the US from the initial settlement.
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Figure 8: Total Factor Productivity, β = .35, ρ = 0: by Region
assume a continuous function of child schooling, S:.
ρ = min
{
.35,
S
43.75
}
In this specification the lower bound for ρ is 0 and the upper bound is .35. Thus at the lower extreme there
is no convergence in human capital, unless schooling was identical across countries. At the upper extreme,
human capital converges at a rate of 1.75 (0.875) % per year, depending on a generation of 20 (or 40) years.
In the upper bound case, it would take a country 39 (78) years to close the gap by 50 percent. With the
data at hand, the more rapid convergence can be seen by the NIC ’s, as well as China and India recently.
For low levels of schooling, the slow convergence, would just as likely appear to be non convergence.
Again, suppose we compare the US with a country like Bhutan. As an approximation, let’s assume that
ρ = 0 for Bhutan, but is given by the above for the US. These would produce a stationary human capital
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for the US and Bhutan of:
h(14.5) = A
1
1−β−ρ exp(
1.45
1− β − ρ ) (31)
h(1.4) = A
1
1−β exp(
.14
1− β ) (32)
h(14.5)
h(1.4)
= A
1−β
1−β−ρ exp(
1.45
1− β − ρ −
.14
1− β ) (33)
For a value of young schooling in the US of 14.5, ρ = .33. For β = .35, and an A = .5, the stationary
relative income gap between the US and Bhutan would be almost 18.3, which is even greater than the
observed gap of about 11. In the data, the gap between the US and lowest output per worker country in
2007 is slightly over 100. The US produces about $76,000 output per worker per year, and Zaire produces
$750 per year. Zaire schooling is 5.4 years overall, and 4.8 years of the young workers. So the model does
not exactly fit. However the next lowest output per worker country in 2007 is Somalia. Real output per
worker in Somalia worker is $1200 per year, and average schooling is 1.8. Ignoring experience and the
spillover for Somalia, the predicted stationary relative human capital gap between the US and Somalia
is 17. The observed income gap is 63. Thus while allowing for convergence for those countries with well
educated young workers, the model also allows for an even greater relative income gap between the richest
countries and the lowest schooling countries.
The results of this new calculation for human capital are contained in Figure 9. We plot the weighted
average human capital by region. Unlike the previous human capital accumulation, there is less evidence
of convergence. Outside of the NIC and Southern Europe, prior to 1950 there was much stronger evidence
of divergence in human capital levels. The gap between Sub-Saharan Africa and the Western Countries is
not much different in 2007 than the gap in 1950. In 1950 under the original calculation of human capital,
the Western Countries average human capital is 5.4, and the Sub Saharan African average is 2.3. Under
the new method of computing human capital, the 1950 average human capital in Western Countries is 6.1
and the Sub-Saharan African average was 1.0. So whereas the gap in the first case is 2.3 the new gap is
6.1. The relative output gap between these two regions in 1950 was 8.2. The new method allows for more
chance for human capital to capture the difference in productivity based on input variations than before.
In Figure 10 we plot the new TFP levels for regions. In contrast to the previous TFP graph, there is
slower long term trend growth in TFP across regions, and a more prominent post 1980 TFP decline in the
advanced countries, Western Countries, Southern Europe, NIC. These three regions have indistinguishable
levels of TFP in 2007. Four other regions appear to be in their own equivalence class of TFP: Central &
Eastern Europe, Asia, Latin America and North Africa. Sub-Saharan Africa remains in the next to the
bottom category, and the Middle East is the lowest TFP region. As with the case with no spillovers, there
is substantial TFP growth for the Middle East and negative TFP growth for the Sub-Saharan Africa region
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Figure 9: Human Capital Per Worker, β = .35, ρ > 0: by Region
since 1820.31
Table 5 presents the results for growth accounting using the new measure of human capital with
spillovers. The new method dramatically increases the share of output growth that is explained by input
accumulation relative to TFP growth. Using either Population - Duration weights, population in 2007
times the number of years of observations per country, or only 2007 population weights, less than one fifth
of real output growth per worker is captured by TFP growth. Recall the comparable figure from both
the base model and the model with only intergenerational human capital accumulation is two fifths. This
result is similar across regions. From a low of -1 percent of growth explained by TFP growth, Sub-Saharan
Africa, to a high of only 13 percent of growth explained by TFP growth, Western Countries, we find that
the new measure of human capital captures the growth of output per worker.
Table 6 presents the results in the variance decomposition of growth rates. While the new measure of
human capital accounts for between five sixths and 100 percent of the growth rate of output per worker,
perhaps more stunning is the rising explanatory power of the variation in input growth in explaining the
cross sectional variation of output growth. For the world as a whole, the new human capital model explains
more than 80 percent of the cross country variations in growth rates using either the covariance share
31However in 1820 there is only one country in the Sub-Saharan Africa region, South Africa. All the countries except for
Ghana appear in 1950. In the non spillover case there is TFP growth in this region from 1950 to 2007, however once one
accounts for international spillovers, there is no growth in TFP over this period.
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Figure 10: Total Factor Productivity, β = .35, ρ > 0: by Region
of Klenow &Rodriguez-Clare or average BDT decomposition. With the much more restrictive covariance
share of capital intensity growth rate variation, inputs explain almost three-quarters of the growth rate
variations! This is an marked increase from the 19% and the 62% of cross country growth rate variation
attained in the base model and the intergenerational human capital accumulation without spillovers. For
the Western Countries, Southern Europe Asia countries, the new human capital model explains better
than 95% of the variation in growth rates, with the NIC right behind at 93%. In all regions the variation
in input growth explains better than three-fifths of the variation in growth rates. Under the restrictive
capital intensity case, three regions have input explanatory shares of 98% or better, and one more at 90%.
Only the Middle East has explanatory share less than 50%, and this is driven by the OPEC countries.
Aggregating the regions into larger groupings reveal even stronger results. Combining the Western
Countries and Southern Europe, the model explains over 95 percent of the cross country growth rate
variations. Adding the NIC and North Africa, increases the model’s power to over 99 percent! Including
Sub-Saharan Africa countries drops the model’s ability, but still it remains over 85 percent. The addition
of the 20 Asia countries marginally improves the fit, as the variation of input growth rates explains 92%
of growth rate variation. Adding in Central and Eastern Europe, Latin America and North Africa drops
the model to 86%explanatory power.
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Table 3: Growth Accounting: New Human Capital β = .35, ρ = 0
Annualized Growth Rates
Region N gy gk ghc gx gz sharegx sharegz
Population-Duration Weights
World 168 1.17% 1.11% 0.53% 0.73% 0.44% 0.624 0.376
(WC) Western Countries 18 1.45 1.56 0.71 1.00 0.46 0.685 0.315
(SE) Southern Europe 7 1.45 1.56 0.85 1.08 0.36 0.748 0.252
(CEE) Central & Eastern Europe 24 1.28 1.26 0.88 1.01 0.27 0.789 0.211
(NIC) Newly Industrialized Countries 5 1.81 2.36 0.93 1.41 0.40 0.778 0.222
(Asia) Asia 20 1.05 0.89 0.33 0.52 0.53 0.495 0.505
(SSA) Sub-Saharan Africa 48 1.06 1.10 0.64 0.86 0.20 0.808 0.192
(LA) Latin America 28 1.19 1.02 0.73 0.91 0.28 0.764 0.136
(ME) Middle East 13 1.17 1.08 0.94 1.00 0.17 0.856 0.144
(NA) North Africa 5 1.17 1.13 0.90 1.00 0.18 0.850 0.150
Population Weights
World 168 1.18% 1.17% 0.53% 0.76% 0.42% 0.642 0.358
WC 18 1.46 1.57 0.72 1.00 0.46 0.686 0.314
SE 7 1.47 1.59 0.85 1.10 0.37 0.750 0.250
CEE 24 0.96 1.15 0.40 0.65 0.31 0.676 0.324
NIC 5 1.81 2.36 0.93 1.41 0.40 0.778 0.222
Asia 20 1.12 1.02 0.38 0.59 0.53 0.527 0.473
SSA 48 1.03 1.14 0.58 0.84 0.19 0.818 0.182
LA 28 1.19 1.04 0.71 0.89 0.31 0.744 0.256
ME 13 1.39 1.42 1.00 1.21 0.18 0.871 0.129
NA 5 1.18 1.16 0.89 1.01 0.17 0.855 0.145
Unweighted
World 168 1.34% 1.62% 0.71% 1.03% 0.31% 0.768 0.232
WC 18 1.69 1.95 0.81 1.19 0.51 0.701 0.299
SE 7 2.55 3.37 1.36 2.03 0.52 0.795 0.205
CEE 24 0.86 1.15 0.19 0.51 0.35 0.592 0.408
NIC 5 1.87 2.43 1.04 1.50 0.37 0.803 0.197
Asia 20 1.49 1.92 0.79 1.17 0.33 0.781 0.219
SSA 48 1.32 1.57 0.78 1.06 0.26 0.802 0.198
LA 28 1.24 1.38 0.59 0.90 0.34 0.726 0.274
ME 13 0.99 1.16 0.95 0.99 0.00 0.998 0.002
NA 5 1.24 1.40 0.81 1.12 0.13 0.899 0.101
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Table 4: Growth Variance Decomposition: Plausible Shares, New Human Capital β = .35, ρ = 0
Region N σgx,gyσ2gy
σgz,gy
σ2gy
σgxˆ,gy
σ2gy
σgzˆ,gy
σ2gy
Sgx Sgz BDTgx BDTgz
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
World 168 .742 .258 .615 .385 .736 .264 .22 .78
WC 18 .756 .244 .636 .364 .605 .395 .46 .54
SE 7 .852 .148 .779 .221 .514 .486 .50 .50
CEE 24 .740 .260 .613 .386 .727 .273 .28 .72
NIC 5 1.064 -0.064 1.095 -0.095 .936 .064 .64 .36
Asia 20 .903 .097 .855 .145 .904 .096 .40 .60
SSA 48 .775 .225 .665 .335 .707 .293 .37 .63
LA 28 .530 .470 .299 .701 .548 .452 .22 .78
ME 13 .532 .468 .301 .699 .585 .415 .44 .56
ME not OPEC 4 .769 .231 .655 .345 .517 .483
ME OPEC 9 .531 .469 .299 .701 .565 .435
NA 5 .563 .437 .347 .653 .837 .163 .84 .16
larger regions
(1): WC & SE 25 .851 .149 .778 .222 .623 .377
(2): (1) & NIC 30 .850 .150 .777 .223 .656 .344
(3): (2) & NA 35 .843 .157 .765 .235 .697 .303
(4): (3) & SSA 83 .788 .212 .683 .317 .701 .299
(5): (4) & Asia 103 .814 .186 .723 .277 .771 .229
(6); (5) & CEE 127 .807 .193 .712 .288 .778 .222
(7): (6) & LA 155 .786 .214 .681 .319 .763 .237
(7); (6) & ME
not OPEC
159 .786 .214 .681 .319 .762 .238
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Table 5: Growth Accounting: New Human Capital β = .35 & .35 ≥ ρ > 0
Annualized Growth Rates
Region N gy ghc gx gz sharegx sharegz
Population-Duration Weights
World 168 1.17% 0.85% 0.97% 0.20% 0.826 0.174
WC 18 1.45 1.12 1.26 0.19 0.869 0.131
SE 7 1.45 1.18 1.30 0.14 0.901 0.099
CEE 24 1.28 1.16 1.19 0.08 0.933 0.067
NIC 5 1.81 1.32 1.67 0.14 0.922 0.078
Asia 20 1.05 0.70 0.76 0.28 0.730 0.270
SSA 48 1.06 1.01 1.08 -0.02 1.023 -0.023
LA 28 1.19 0.59 1.15 0.04 0.966 0.034
ME 13 1.17 1.28 1.16 0.01 0.990 0.010
NA 5 1.17 1.05 1.08 0.09 0.921 0.079
Population Weights
World 168 1.18% 0.87% 1.00% 0.18% 0.847 0.153
WC 18 1.46 1.12 1.27 0.19 0.869 0.131
SE 7 1.47 1.19 1.32 0.15 0.902 0.098
CEE 24 0.96 0.87 0.95 0.01 0.988 0.012
NIC 5 1.81 1.32 1.67 0.14 0.922 0.078
Asia 20 1.12 0.75 0.84 0.29 0.745 0.255
SSA 48 1.03 0.98 1.08 -0.05 1.050 -0.050
LA 28 1.19 0.64 1.12 0.08 0.935 0.065
ME 13 1.39 1.44 1.41 -0.02 1.016 -0.016
NA 5 1.18 1.05 1.10 0.08 0.931 0.069
Unweighted
World 168 1.34% 1.19% 1.34% -0.00% 1.000 -0.000
WC 18 1.69 1.28 1.50 0.19 0.888 0.112
SE 7 2.55 1.94 2.42 0.14 0.946 0.054
CEE 24 0.86 0.91 0.98 -0.11 1.129 -0.129
NIC 5 1.87 1.40 1.74 0.13 0.930 0.070
Asia 20 1.49 1.18 1.43 0.06 0.959 0.041
SSA 48 1.32 1.23 1.35 -0.03 1.025 -0.025
LA 28 1.24 0.94 1.19 0.05 0.959 0.041
ME 13 0.99 1.51 1.25 -0.27 1.270 -0.270
NA 5 1.24 1.08 1.24 -0.01 1.000 -0.000
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Table 6: Growth Variance Decomposition: Plausible Bounds, New Human Capital β = .35, .35 ≥ ρ > 0
Region N σgx,gyσ2gy
σgz,gy
σ2gy
σgxˆ,gy
σ2gy
σgzˆ,gy
σ2gy
Sgx Sgz BDTgx BDTgz
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
World 168 .814 .186 .722 .278 .825 .175 .22 .78
WC 18 .984 .016 .976 .024 .986 .014 .46 .54
SE 7 1.000 .000 .999 .001 .956 .044 .50 .50
CEE 24 .721 .279 .583 .417 .678 .322 .28 .72
NIC 5 .932 .068 .898 .102 .932 .068 .64 .36
Asia 20 .989 .011 .983 .017 .958 .042 .40 .60
SSA 48 .881 .119 .822 .178 .847 .153 .37 .63
LA 28 .748 .252 .624 .376 .771 .229 .22 .78
ME 13 .590 .410 .388 .612 .626 .374 .44 .56
ME not OPEC 4 .990 .010 .985 .015 .993 .007
ME OPEC 9 .579 .421 .372 .628 .594 .406
NA 5 1.330 -0.330 1.493 -0.493 .663 .337 .84 .16
larger regions
(1): WC & SE 25 1.004 -0.004 1.007 -0.007 .979 .021
(2): (1) & NIC 30 1.004 -0.004 1.006 -0.006 .986 .014
(3): (2) & NA 35 .995 .005 .992 .008 .993 .007
(4): (3) & SSA 83 .903 .097 .855 .145 .876 .124
(5): (4) & Asia 103 .923 .077 .884 .116 .921 .079
(6); (5) & CEE 127 .870 .130 .807 .193 .858 .142
(7): (6) & LA 155 .863 .137 .795 .205 .858 .142
(7); (6) & ME
not OPEC
159 .864 .136 .797 .203 .860 .140
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6 Robustness: Development Accounting, Alternative Parameter
Specifications, & First Half and Second Half Results
In this section we present evidence on the robustness of the results. First we examine a range of other
parameter specifications. Second we split the data into to two equal time periods. For each country we
found the closest midpoint year observation and then produced samples with that midyear observation
as the terminal and initial value. This evidence is consistent with the conclusion that the model with
intergenerational human capital accumulation with spillovers fits the data well.
6.1 Development Accounting
We have shown that variations in growth rates are captured mostly by the variations in input growth rates
when inputs include intergenerational human capital accumulation. Does this also hold for variations in
levels of output per worker? To this question we now turn. Similar to variance decomposition analysis
of growth rates, we conduct a variance decomposition analysis on log levels of output per worker. Once
again we can combine the factors of production per worker into the variable x. Assuming a Cobb-Douglas
production function produces the following result:
ln yit = ln zit + lnxit, (34)
lnxit = α ln kit + (1− α) lnhit (35)
As with our variance decomposition of growth rates, we use the two covariance decompositions suggested
by Klenow, Rodriguez-Clare (1997). In the first, we assume that output variations arise from both input
variations and TFP variations:
σ2ln yt = σln xt,ln yt + σln zt,ln yt (36)
In the second, we assume that higher TFP induces input accumulation of physical capital, and hence only
the variations in physical capital intensity and variations in human capital are variations in inputs that
account for variations in output per worker. Thus we have:
σ2ln yt = σln xˆt,ln yt + σln zˆt,ln yt (37)
ln xˆt =
α
1− α [ln kt − ln yt] + lnht (38)
ln zˆt =
α
1− α ln zt (39)
Finally under the view that TFP induces factor accumulation, and that the predictable or correlated portion
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of inputs should be assigned to TFP, the share of output per worker can be written as:
1 =
(σln z + σln xρln x,ln z)2
σ2ln y
+
(1− ρ2ln x,ln z)σ2ln x
σ2ln y
(40)
where the first term is now a plausible upper bound on the proportion of the variation in log output per
worker explained by variation in log TFP. At the other end of the theoretical spectrum, the predictable
or correlated component of TFP arises from endogenous factor accumulation. Assigning this predictatble
component to factors produces the following variance decomposition:
1 =
(σln x + σln zρln x,ln z)2
σ2ln y
+
(1− ρ2ln x,ln z)σ2ln z
σ2ln y
(41)
The first term is now the proportion of the variation of output per worker that explained by variation in
inputs. We examine these for the initial conditions as well as the terminal observation.32 Thus the shares
of the variance of log output per worker are given by:
Sln x =
σ2ln x
σ2ln y
+
1
2
ρ2ln x,ln z
(
σ2ln z − σ2ln x
)
σ2ln y
+
σln xσln zρln x,ln z
σ2ln y
(42)
Sln z =
σ2ln z
σ2ln y
+
1
2
ρ2ln x,ln z
(
σ2ln x − σ2ln z
)
σ2ln y
+
σln xσln zρln x,ln z
σ2ln y
(43)
Figures 11 - 13 contain the time series of the share of variations in log output per worker explained by
variations in log inputs per worker. In each graph we present three different cases, the base case with no
intergenerational human capital accumulation, and intergenerational human capital accumulation, β = .35
with no spillover, ρ = 0, and with spillover ρ ≥ .35. The thick curves in each of the three human capital
specifications are the results from using all of the data. The thinner curves, in each of the three human
capital specifications, are the results from each decade cross section. We present them in order of rising
input ability to explain log level variations in output per worker. Thus we start wight the most restrictive
assumption that only physical capital intensity variations contribute to input explanations of log level
output per worker variations. This is contained in Figure 11.
Both intergenerational human capital models significantly improve on the base Mincer human capital
cross section model. In every cross section they outperform the base Mincer human capital model in
explaining cross sectional output per worker differences. The average highest share of the variance of
log output per worker comes from the international human capital model with spillovers. The average
explanation in this case is 55%!33 in contrast the human capital model without spillovers explains 50%.34
The base Mincer human capital model explains only 30% of log output per worker differences.35.
32All terminal years are 2007, except for East Germany, which has a terminal observation in 1990.
33When we use all years, this model explains 52%.
34When we use all years, this model explains only 41%.
35When we use all years, this model explains 31%
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Figure 11: Covariance Development Accounting (Klenow, Rodriguez-Clare): Base, β = .35, ρ = 0, β =
.35, ρ > 0
Early on there is little difference between the intergenerational human capital models with and without
spillovers. Not until roughly 1860 does the model with spillovers diverge from the model without spillovers.
In all years since 1850 the model with spillovers does a better job of capturing log output per worker
differences than the model without spillovers.
Figure 12 contains the results for the covariance share decomposition without the limitation on the
physical capital input to physical capital intensity, ky . This implies that the covariance of log input per
worker with log output per worker is credited to inputs. The time series of all three human capital models
are identical to the previous case, except for level. Under the assumption that inputs per worker include
only physical capital intensity and human capital, all three human capital models explained less than 40
percent of output per worker variations. When inputs include physical capital and human capital, all three
models explain better than 50 percent of output per worker differences. The model without spillovers
explains 61% of log output per worker differences, and the model with spillovers explains 68% of output
per worker differences.
Allowing the data to determine how much of the correlation or predictable component of log input and
log TFP to allocate to each other produces the final metric on the importance of input variations. Figure
13 contains the results for the three human capital specifications. For the base Mincer human capital
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Figure 12: Covariance Development Accounting: Base, β = .35, ρ = 0, β = .35, ρ > 0
model, there is essentially no change from the results in Figure 12. Log input variations explain 52% of
the difference in log output per worker. For the intergenerational human capital models, however, there is
further improvement. For the model without spillovers, log input per worker variation now explains 68%
of log output per worker variation. For the model with spillovers, log input per worker variation explains
74% of log output per worker variation. Thus we find that input variations are quite capable of explaining
at least half of the observed variation in output per worker. Only under the assumption that all correlation
between log TFP and log physical capital is induced by log TFP does one produce estimates of input
share significantly below 40 percent. Once one allows the data to help inform about the importance of the
association, we find that log input variation explains at least half if not three quarters of the variation in
log output per worker.
6.2 Alternative Parameter Specifications
In this section we show that the results of the previous section are robust to different parameter values.
Thus our conclusion that intergenerational human capital accumulation models with spillovers dramatically
help to explain variation in long run growth rates, as well as variations in living standards is robust. We
examine a range of values on the triple (A, ρ, β) with the restriction that the unweighted average growth
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Figure 13: Development Accounting: Base, β = .35, ρ = 0, β = .35, ρ > 0
rate of output per worker is fully explained by input growth.36 For various combinations of (A, ρ, β) we
show that between two-thirds to ninety percent of the variation in growth rates of output per worker is
captured by input growth variations. We also conduct development accounting exercises, and show that
between one-third and three-quarters of the variation in log levels of output per worker are explained by
variations in inputs per worker, with stronger belief towards the higher range.
We searched over a wide range of values of β and ρ. For β we examined values from [.05, .80], and for ρ we
examined values from [0, .65] with the constraint β + ρ ≤ 1. We combine both the variance decomposition
of growth results and the development accounting results in Table 7.37 The first two columns of the
growth variance decomposition contain the covariance accounting results. The first allows input share to
be from the covariance of input growth with output growth. The second restricts input growth to be
36This implies that the average growth rates produced by input growth, weighted either by length of observation multiplied
by 2007 population, or 2007 population, are less than the appropriately weighted average growth rates of output per worker.
This implies that the models generally explain between 80% to 90% of weighted output per worker growth.
37We present the results of the grid on β. We think of this exercise as one of quantitative identification. That is the
parameters chosen in the ρ function and the A function are picked in order to best fit both the growth accounting and the
variance decomposition of growth rates. This exercise is conducted similar to Tamura and Simon (2012), Murphy, Simon and
Tamura (2008) and Tamura (2006). Their models are forced to fit actual time series, and the forcing variables, such as price
of space, or efficiency of schooling time, are allowed to be whatever they need to be to fit the series. That is given a specific
model, what must parameters be in order to fit the data. In theory we could use a search algorithm for the best fitting
parameters that minimizes a loss function. We leave that to future research. We experimented with other combinations of
(A, β, ρ) but the overwhelming majority of those specifications performed worse than those presented in Table 7 either in the
variance decomposition of growth rates or the variance decomposition of log levels.
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human capital growth and physical capital intensity growth. The column marked World is the average
BDT decomposition. In the column marked Region, we examined each of the regions separately, producing
the average BDT decomposition for each and then averaged the results using arithmetic means, weighted
arithmetic means, harmonic means and weighted harmonic means. We then averaged each of these four
expectations to form the Region average.38 With only seven exceptions out of 52 possible cases, inputs
explain between two-thirds and 90% of growth rate variations! In the seven exceptions all but one of them
have input shares over 50%, and all but two of them have input shares exceeding 60%. It is fair to say, that
in the variance decomposition of growth rates the model with human capital spillovers explains between
three-fifths and ninety percent of the growth variations!
In the development accounting portion of Table 7, the first four columns contain the covariance decom-
positions. The first is the covariance decomposition of log input with log output on all years of data. The
second is the covariance decomposition of log input with log output for each decade separately, and then
averaged over all years. The next column is the covariance decomposition of log input with log output, but
with inputs restricted to human capital and physical capital intensity on all years. The fourth column in
this heading repeats the cross sectional covariance decomposition of log input with log output, with inputs
restricted to human capital and physical capital intensity, and then averaged across the years. The final
two columns in this group are average BDT decompositions, first over all years simultaneously, and the
next column contains the average BDT decomposition by region for all years and then averaged. Ignoring
the restricted input measures to start, we find that log level input variations explain between three-fifths
and over three-fourths of log level output variations. Even in the restricted input case, we find that log
level input variations explain at least half of the log level output variations 16 times out of 26. In no case
does it fail to explain at least 40 percent of the log level variations.
The final column of Table 7 is an arithmetic average of all columns. In 12 out of 13 cases the average
exceeds two thirds, and in the one case below two thirds, it explains over five-eighths. The spread for the
twelve cases is very small, ranging between 67.5% to 69.6%. Thus we believe that our results are robust,
variations in input growth or log levels explain more than seventy percent of output growth variations, and
over three-fifths of log level variations, respectively.39
6.3 First Half & Second Half
In this section we examine how well the model works for early years and later years. For each country we
found the midpoint year observation, hereafter referred to as midyear, and split the country’s time series
38This allows us to see if some regions are driving the results and if the specification succeeds or fails spectacularly in some
regions.
39In computations not shown, we eliminate from consideration all parameter specifications with β > .55. Essentially for
all values of β > .55 the level of TFP in many regions exceeds that of the Western Countries, Southern European countries
and the N.I.C.’s for most of the twentieth century. We consider this result to be implausible, and exclude these parameter
specifications from the rest of the analysis.
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into two parts. We examine how the models fit the data when comparing the period from the first year
of observation until the midyear, and then from the midyear to 2007. If the human capital calculations
are robust, then they should fit each of these periods as well as the overall period, absent innovations to
the underlying structure of the economy. Tables 8 - 11 contain the results of both the growth accounting
and the variance decompositions for both the original model, and the new human capital model both with
and without spillovers. Tables 8 and 9 present growth accounting for each period, and Tables 10 and 11
present the variance decomposition results for the original model. We concentrate on the results contained
in the top third of Tables 8 and 9, those arising from population-duration weights. There is a noticeable
acceleration in growth rates between the first half and the second half, from 0.61% per year to 1.79% per
year. Growth rates accelerate in every region except for Sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East. It is
all the more remarkable since for all of these regions, except for Sub-Saharan Africa, the second half of
the data include both World Wars, and the Great Depression! The base model explains three-fifths of
growth in the first half and two-thirds of growth in the second half. The intergenerational model of human
capital accumulation without spillovers explains ninety percent of the growth in the first half, but only
four-sevenths of growth in the second half. With spillovers the intergenerational human capital model
captures 95% of growth in the first half and 80% of growth in the second half. While the intergenerational
model overestimates growth in some regions in the first half, Southern Europe, Central & Eastern Europe,
NIC and Asia, and underestimates growth in these regions in the second half, the model does capture
the acceleration in growth rates well. For example in Asia growth is predicted in the first half of 0.185
(compared with .16 actual), and 1.34 in the second half (compared with 1.89 actual). In three regions the
intergenerational model over predicts second half growth. In Latin America first half growth is predicted
0.53 (compared with 1.09 actual), and second half growth is predicted 1.94 (compared with 1.53 actual).
Recall that in the variance decomposition of growth rates, the base model explained about half of the
variance of growth, see Table 2. When the data is split, the base model explains 60 percent of the variation
of growth in the first half of the data, before falling to slightly less than a third of the variation in the
second half,(based on using the covariance share and average BDT share). The decline is pretty uniform
across the different regions, with the largest decline in the Western Countries and the non OPEC Middle
East regions. In the Western Countries, the model’s explanatory power drops from 70 percent to only 17
percent, and for the non OPEC Middle East the base model suffers a decline from 60 percent to 9 percent.
The decline is evident for the larger regions as well. Whereas in the first half of the data the model explains
anywhere from 56 percent to 67 percent of the variation in growth, in the second half the model is only
capable of explaining between thirty percent and forty percent of the variation.
The intergenerational human capital model improves the ability to explain the cross sectional variation
in growth rates. Without spillovers the model explains two thirds of the variation in growth rates in the
first half, and slightly less than half in the second half. While explaining less than half of the cross sectional
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variation in growth rates in the second half, this is still a large change compared to the one third share of
growth variations explained in the base model over the same period. In the first half the intergenerational
model explains no less than half the growth rate variations in each region, and in the larger regions it
explains between two-thirds to four-fifths of the growth rate variations. In the second half the model can
explain only about one seventh of the growth variations in the Western Countries, one third of the growth
variations amongst the NIC, and between four-ninths and three-fifths in all the other regions. In the larger
regions the model explains somewhere between 40 percent and slightly more than half of the growth rate
variations.
Like the previous results on growth rates over the entire horizon, in examining the behavior in two
separate time periods the spillover model implies that substantially more output growth is associated with
the growth of aggregate input. The change is most dramatic for the Western Countries and Southern
Europe regions. For the full time period, the intergenerational model without spillovers explains between
half and three-fifths of the cross sectional variation in growth rates; the addition of spillovers increases the
explanatory power to over 95 percent. In Tables 10 and 11 the change arising from spillovers is smaller. In
the first half the spillover model explains 70 percent of the growth rate variations in the world compared
with two-thirds without spillovers. The fit ranges from half in North Africa to ninety percent in Southern
Europe and the NIC. In the larger regions, the spillover model explains between two thirds and ninety
percent of the growth rate variations. In the second half, the spillover model improves the explanatory
power of the intergenerational model from 49 percent to 51 percent. Most of the gain comes from the
Western Countries, going from 14 percent to 24 percent, and Southern Europe, going from 54 percent to
65 percent. In the larger regions the spillover model explains between 45 percent and 57 percent of the
growth rate variations.
The results obtained by splitting the sample into equal length time periods suggest that both the base
model and the intergenerational human capital model’s results are robust. While there is a lessening of both
models’ ability to explain growth rate variations in the second half of the data, they both are reasonable
characterizations of the data.
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Table 8: Growth Accounting First Half: Base & New Human Capital β = .35 & .35 ≥ ρ > 0
Annualized Growth Rates
Region N gy gk gbasehc g
ρ=0
hc g
ρ≥0
hc share
base shareρ=0 shareρ≥0
Population-Duration Weights
World 168 0.61% 0.59% 0.24% 0.50% 0.55% 0.605 0.885 0.947
Western Countries 18 1.11 1.04 0.45 0.70 0.84 0.584 0.734 0.815
Southern Europe 7 0.81 0.80 0.28 0.88 0.97 0.557 1.051 1.121
Central and Eastern Europe 24 0.89 0.76 0.36 1.17 1.26 0.542 1.148 1.218
Newly Industrialized Countries 5 0.67 0.99 0.25 0.71 0.79 0.745 1.203 1.280
Asia 20 0.16 0.17 0.08 0.18 0.20 0.679 1.073 1.160
Sub-Saharan Africa 48 1.42 1.68 0.65 0.66 0.73 0.798 0.819 0.849
Latin America 28 1.09 0.75 0.29 0.39 0.43 0.406 0.468 0.489
Middle East 13 1.88 1.74 0.26 1.12 1.17 0.563 0.760 0.772
North Africa 5 1.01 0.90 0.09 0.84 0.84 0.460 0.911 0.914
Population Weights
World 168 0.77% 0.75% 0.33% 0.55% 0.61% 0.642 0.833 0.886
WC 18 1.11 1.04 0.45 0.71 0.84 0.580 0.736 0.816
SE 7 0.86 0.89 0.29 0.90 1.00 0.571 1.043 1.116
CEE 24 0.86 0.52 0.49 0.93 1.02 0.536 0.874 0.945
NIC 5 0.66 0.98 0.25 0.71 0.79 0.744 1.204 1.281
Asia 20 0.30 0.34 0.14 0.31 0.34 0.685 1.069 1.132
SSA 48 1.43 1.72 0.68 0.63 0.69 0.820 0.812 0.843
LA 28 1.36 1.01 0.41 0.48 0.54 0.449 0.483 0.515
ME 13 2.81 2.62 0.43 1.13 1.21 0.577 0.686 0.700
NA 5 1.46 1.29 0.19 0.85 0.85 0.512 0.792 0.794
Unweighted
World 168 1.47% 1.61% 0.59% 0.88% 1.03% 0.647 0.775 0.839
WC 18 1.46 1.80 0.45 0.88 1.08 0.613 0.808 0.901
SE 7 2.38 3.61 0.59 1.53 1.86 0.672 0.936 1.030
CEE 24 0.74 0.17 0.68 0.97 1.11 0.626 0.875 0.998
NIC 5 0.61 0.68 0.12 1.03 1.07 0.508 1.503 1.546
Asia 20 1.03 2.16 0.42 0.76 0.85 0.971 1.192 1.256
SSA 48 1.67 1.72 0.72 0.82 0.97 0.648 0.693 0.751
LA 28 1.75 1.66 0.61 0.69 0.85 0.549 0.578 0.638
ME 13 1.89 1.90 0.58 1.18 1.27 0.657 0.798 0.821
NA 5 1.98 1.76 0.32 0.86 0.87 0.552 0.722 0.724
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Table 9: Growth Accounting Second Half: Base & New Human Capital β = .35 & .35 ≥ ρ > 0
Annualized Growth Rates
Region N gy gk gbasehc g
ρ=0
hc g
ρ≥0
hc share
base shareρ=0 shareρ≥0
Population-Duration Weights
World 168 1.79% 1.70% 0.86% 0.58% 1.22% 0.671 0.573 0.806
Western Countries 18 1.67 1.86 0.65 0.70 1.31 0.629 0.647 0.891
Southern Europe 7 2.08 2.33 0.94 0.82 1.37 0.671 0.633 0.811
Central and Eastern Europe 24 1.74 1.77 1.09 0.58 1.04 0.759 0.572 0.740
Newly Industrialized Countries 5 2.98 3.86 0.96 1.09 1.77 0.645 0.675 0.827
Asia 20 1.89 1.61 0.83 0.53 1.21 0.575 0.470 0.709
Sub-Saharan Africa 48 0.74 0.67 0.96 0.46 0.73 1.107 0.713 1.270
Latin America 28 1.53 1.58 1.03 0.26 0.84 1.317 1.037 1.268
Middle East 13 1.10 1.06 1.03 0.78 1.40 0.956 0.848 1.108
North Africa 5 1.51 1.49 0.96 0.97 1.36 0.760 0.770 0.924
Population Weights
World 168 1.67% 1.68% 0.90% 0.52% 1.20% 0.721 0.579 0.839
WC 18 1.91 2.06 0.72 0.74 1.31 0.611 0.616 0.891
SE 7 2.10 2.34 0.93 0.82 1.38 0.669 0.633 0.811
CEE 24 1.16 1.89 0.96 -0.19 0.68 1.114 0.484 0.957
NIC 5 2.98 3.85 0.96 1.09 1.77 0.645 0.675 0.827
Asia 20 1.98 1.77 0.87 0.53 1.21 0.591 0.477 0.705
SSA 48 0.64 0.62 0.98 0.49 1.20 1.264 0.827 1.507
LA 28 1.36 1.45 1.05 0.25 0.87 1.329 0.985 1.266
ME 13 0.66 0.97 1.25 0.89 1.71 1.637 1.376 1.940
NA 5 1.35 1.41 0.98 0.94 1.36 0.819 0.814 0.993
Unweighted
World 168 1.20% 1.68% 1.00% 0.48% 1.32% 1.022 0.755 1.197
WC 18 2.08 2.33 0.94 0.81 1.44 0.671 0.633 0.861
SE 7 2.80 3.19 0.90 1.20 1.95 0.594 0.664 0.843
CEE 24 1.03 2.30 0.85 -0.72 0.63 1.329 0.356 1.190
NIC 5 3.10 4.11 0.97 1.06 1.70 0.650 0.668 0.806
Asia 20 1.98 1.98 1.01 0.82 1.49 0.674 0.612 0.836
SSA 48 0.95 1.41 1.05 0.73 1.48 1.221 1.006 1.520
LA 28 0.75 1.08 1.03 0.23 1.01 1.645 0.957 1.635
ME 13 -0.03 0.32 1.35 1.71 1.27 - - -
NA 5 0.38 0.94 1.13 0.75 1.38 2.354 1.980 2.803
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7 Evidence from Micro Literature
Our work produces human capital across countries. How would one get an independent measure of
human capital, separate from the macro approach here? This is exactly answered in the work of Hendricks
(2002) and Schoellman (2011). In their works these authors attempt to measure relative human capital
of individuals educated from different countries working in the same labor market and having the same
observable characteristics, i.e. years of schooling, years of work experience, marital status, sex, etc. We
can compare our values of human capital relative to those in Hendricks and Schoellman to see if the human
capital measures that are produced here are consistent with micro evidence.
In this section we take our estimates of human capital in 1990 & 2000 and compare them with micro
evidence from Hendricks and Schoellman. Table 12 presents comparisons of our relative human capital and
those from Hendricks (2002) and Schoellman (2012). We have much more in common with Schoellman than
with Hendricks. In the first column we regressed log relative human capital by Hendricks (Schoellman)
against our log relative human capital for 15 to 24 year olds.40 We add regional dummies and find the
same results. We also ran regressions in the levels, and those are reported in Table 14 as well. Again we see
that our measures of human capital are highly positively correlated with both Hendricks and Schoellman.
The model human capital is more closely related to Schoellman’s estimates of relative human capital, than
Hendricks.
Our new estimates are much closer to those of Schoellman than Hendricks. While Hendricks typically
reports human capital in many countries greater than that in the US, we find no country with human
capital in excess of the US. Schoellman only finds one country, Netherlands, to have higher human capital
than the US. Furthermore our human capital estimates of Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America are
on average only about one quarter of the US, one sixth of the US and thirty percent of the US, respectively.
Our Middle East countries typically have only a fifth of the US human capital per worker.
Hendricks finds that relative human capital of those educated outside of the United States had attained
92 percent of the US human capital level in 1990. Our measure of relative human capital in 1990 ranges
from 22 percent for 35 to 44 year olds and 31 percent for 15 to 24 year olds. In comparison the same
countries have relative output per worker of 22 percent. So our measure of relative human capital is much
closer to the relative output of those countries’ workers.
We are much more closely correlated with Schoellman (2011). He finds 2000 relative human capital of
37 percent, compared with ours of 30 percent for 15 to 24 year olds and 22 percent for 35 to 44 year olds.
Output per worker for these countries relative to the US worker is 18.5 percent. So again we are closer to
the relative productivity on average than Hendricks was in 1990.
Table A5 takes from Hendricks (2002), and contains the 1990 values of relative earnings of immigrants
40We do this with and without population weights. The results do not vary much with population weights, so we only
report the unweighted regressions.
40
to the US, controlling for age, education and sex. The first column lists the country of origin. The second
column presents his adjusted relative earnings (100 base), and the third column presents the human capital
from this paper relative to the US in 1990. We present three different relative human capital values for each
country, those for ages 15-24, 25-34 and 35-44. We examine these three groups as they are the most likely
immigrant population age groups, who are educated in the origination country. The final four columns
present the year 2000 relative human capital of countries from Schoellman (2011) and our relative human
capital for these countries.
8 Conclusion
The paper presents a simple model of human capital accumulation and physical capital accumulation
within the framework of a standard Cobb-Douglas aggregate production function. We use the new data
created here to estimate new values of country specific human capital. Using a method standard in the
labor literature we allow for Mincerian age-earnings relationships to hold within each country, but allow
for human capital to accumulate across generations. This accumulation technology is similar to Bils and
Klenow (2000), Lucas (1988), Tamura (1991,2002,2006). We allow human capital to build on the shoulders
of the previous generation. We find that this model can explain all of the long term growth of output per
worker, and between 70 and 80 percent of the cross sectional variation in output per worker growth. The
results of the development accounting show that the new human capital model is capable of explaining
between 50 percent and generally closer to 70 and 80 percent of the differences in log output per worker.
The plausibility of the estimates can be determined by examining other predictions that can be made
with the data. Our construction produces a distribution of human capital for every country. Theories that
consider the inequality of human capital (usually without an age distribution) and their effects on growth
can be tested with our measures of the distribution of human capital, for example Banerjee and Newman
(1993), Barro (2000), Chen (2003), Benabou (1996a,b), Benhabib and Spiegal (1994), Galor and Tsiddon
(1997), Persson and Tabelllini (1994), etc. Additionally we can combine our data with that contained in
Tamura (2006), to examine the connection between mortality risk and human capital accumulation. Finally
the data augmented with fertility provides an ability to test long run growth theories of Galor (2005) and
his coauthors, Galor and Weil (2000), Galor and Moav (2004), Galor, Moav and Vollrath (2009).
41
References
Acemoglu, Daron, Johnson, Simon, Robinson, James A. “The Colonial Origins of Comparative
Development: An Empirical Investigation,” American Economic Review 91, 2001: 1369-1401.
Acemoglu, Daron, Johnson, Simon, Robinson, James A. “Reversal of Fortune: Geography and Insti-
tutions in the Making of the Modern World Income Distribution,” Quarterly Journal of Economics
118, 2002: 1231-1294.
Acemoglu, Daron, Johnson, Simon, Robinson, James A. “The Rise of Europe: Atlantic Trade,
Institutional Change and Economic Growth,” American Economic Review 95, 2005a: 546-579.
Acemoglu, Daron, Johnson, Simon, Robinson, James A. “Institutions as the Fundamental Cause
of Long-Run Growth,” in Philippe Aghion and Steven Durlauf (eds.), Handbook of Economic
Growth; Amsterdam: North-Holland, 2005b.
Baier, Scott, Dwyer, Gerald P., Tamura, Robert. “How Important Are Capital and Total Factor
Productivity for Economic Growth?” Economic Inquiry 44, 2006: 23-49.
Banerjee, Abhijit, Newman, Andrew. “Occupational Choice and the Process of Development,” Jour-
nal of Political Economy 101, 1993: 274-298.
Barro, Robert. “Economic Growth in a Panel of Countries,” Journal of Economic Growth 5, 2000:
5-32.
Becker, Gary S., Murphy, Kevin M., Tamura, Robert. “Human Capital, Fertility, and Economic
Growth,” Journal of Political Economy 98, 1990: S12-S37.
Benabou, Roland. “Heterogeneity, Stratification and Growth: Macroeconomic Implications of Com-
munity Structure and School Finance,” American Economic Review 86, 1996a: 584-609.
Benabou, Roland. “Inequality and Growth,” in Ben Bernanke and Julio Rotemberg (eds.), NBER
Macroeconomics Annual 1996 : Cambridge, MA: NMIT Press, 1996b.
Benhabib, Jess, Spiegel, Mark. “Role of Human Capital in Economic Development: Evidence from
Aggregate Cross-Country Data,” Journal of Monetary Economics 43, 1994: 143-173.
Bils, Mark and Klenow, Pete. “Does Schooling Cause Growth?” American Economic Review 90,
2000: 1160-1183.
Canaday, Neil, and Tamura, Robert. “White Discrimination in Provision of Black Education: Plan-
tations and Towns ”Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 33, 2009: 1490-1530.
Caselli, Francesco. “Accounting for Cross-Country Income Differences,”in Philippe Aghion and Steven
Durlauf (eds.), Handbook of Economic Growth; Amsterdam: North-Holland, 2005.
42
Chen, Been-Lon. “An Inverted-U Relationship Between Inequality and Long-Run Growth,” Eco-
nomics Letters 78, 2003: 205-212.
Galor, Oded. “The Transition from Stagnation to Growth: Unified Growth Theory,” in Philippe
Aghion and Steven Durlauf (eds.), Handbook of Economic Growth; Amsterdam: North-Holland,
2005.
Galor, Oded, Tsiddon, Daniel. “The Distribution of Human Capital and Economic Growth,” Journal
of Economic Growth 2, 1997: 93-124.
Galor, Oded., Weil, David. “Population, Technology, and Growth: From the Malthusian Regime to
the Demographic Transition and Beyond,” American Economic Review 90, 2000: 806-828.
Galor, Oded, Moav, Omer. “From Physical to Human Capital Accumulation: Inequality in the
Process of Development,” Review of Economic Studies 71, 2004: 1001-1026.
Galor, Oded., Moav, Omer, Vollrath, Dietrich. “Inequality in Land Ownership, the Emergence of
Human Capital Promoting Institutions and the Great Divergence,” Review of Economic Studies
76, 2009: 143-179.
Goldin, Claudia. “The Human Capital Century and American Leadership,” Journal of Economic
History 61, 2001: 263-291.
Goldin, Claudia, Katz, Lawrence. The Race Beween Education and Technology ; Cambridge, MA: The
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2008.
Gollin, Douglas. “Getting Income Shares Right Journal of Political Economy 110, 2002: 458-474.
Gwartney, James, Lawson, Robert. Economic Freedom of the World: 2008 Annual Report.
Hall, Robert, and Jones, Charles I. “Why Do Some Countries Produce So Much More Output per
Worker Than Others?” Quarterly Journal of Economics 114, 1999: 83-116.
Hendricks, Lutz. “How Important is Human Capital for Development? Evidence from Immigrant
Earnings,” American Economic Review 92, 2002: 198-219.
Historical Statistics of the United States: Millennial Edition Cambridge University Press: New York
City, 2006.
Jones, Charles I. “R&D Based Models of Economic Growth,” Journal of Political Economy 103,
1995: 759-784.
Jones, Charles, I. “Time Series Tests of Endogenous Growth Models,” Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics 110, 1995: 495-525.
Jones, Charles I. “Was an Industrial Revolution Inevitable? Economic Growth Over the Very Long
Run, ” Advances in Macroeconomics 1, 2001: Article 1.
43
Keefer, Philip, Knack, Stephen. “Does Social Capital Have an Economic Payoff? A Cross-Country
Investigation,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 112, 1997a: 1251-1288.
Keefer, Philip, Knack, Stephen. “Why Don’t Poor Countries Catch Up? A Cross-National Test of
Instutitional Explanation,” Economic Inquiry 35, 1997b: 590-602.
Klenow, Pete, and Rodriguez-Clare, Andreas. “The Neoclassical Revival in Growth Economics: Has
It Gone Too Far?” NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1997, 73-114.
Lefgren, Lars, Lindquist, Matthew J., and SIms, David. “Rich Dad, Smart Dad: Decomposing the
Intergenerational Transmission of Income ”Journal of Political Economy 120, 2012: 268-303.
Lindert, Peter H. Growing Public New York: Cambridge University Press 2004.
Kormendi, Roger, Meguire, Philip. “Macroeconomic Determinants of Growth: Cross-Country Evi-
dence,” Journal of Monetary Economics 16, 1985: 141-163.
Lucas, Robert E., Jr. “On the Mechanics of Economic Development,” Journal of Monetary Economics
22, 1988: 3-42.
Maddison, Angus. Statistics on World Population, GDP and GDP Per Capita, 1-2006 AD data from
personal website: http://www.ggdc.net/maddison
Mitchell, B.R. International Historical Statistics: Africa, Asia & Oceania 1750-2000. Fourth Edition,
Palgrave Macmillan, London 2003a.
Mitchell, B.R. International Historical Statistics: The Americas 1750-2000 Fifth Edition, Palgrave
Macmillan, London, 2003b.
Mitchell, B.R. Interational Historical Statistics: Europe 1750-2000 Fifth Edition, Palgrave Macmil-
lan, London, 2003c.
Morris, Cynthia, and Adelman, I. Comparative Patterns of Economic Development. Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1988.
Mulligan, C. Parental Priorities and Economic Inequality University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1997.
Murphy, Kevin M., Simon, Curtis J., Tamura, Robert. “Fertility Decline, Baby Boom, and Economic
Growth,” Journal of Human Capital 2, 2008: 262-302.
North, Douglass C. Structure and Change in Economic History New York: W. W. Norton & Company
1981.
North, Douglass C. Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance New York: Cam-
bridge University Press 1990.
Parente, Stephen L., Prescott, Edward C. “Barriers to Technology Adoption and Development ”Jour-
nal of Political Economy 102, 1994: 298-321.
44
Parente, Stephen L., Prescott, Edward C. “Monopoly Rights: A Barrier to Riches ”American Eco-
nomic Review 1999: 1216-1233.
Parente, Stephen L., Prescott, Edward C. Barriers to Riches Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 2002.
Persson, Torsten, Tabellini, Guido. “Is Inequality Harmful for Growth?” American Economic Review
84, 1994: 600-621.
Romer, Paul. “Increasing Returns and Long-Run Growth,” Journal of Political Economy 94, 1986:
1002-1037.
Romer, Paul. “Endogenous Technological Change,” Journal of Political Economy 98, 1990: S71-S102.
Schoellman, Todd. “The Causes and Consequences of Cross-Country Differences in Schooling At-
tainment,” Review of Economic Studies 79, 2012: 388-417.
Steckel, Richard H., Floud, Roderick. Health and Welfare During Industrialization. Chicago: NBER
University of Chicago Press, 1997.
Summers, Robert, Heston, Alan, Aten, Bettina. Penn World Tables Version 6.3 Center for Interna-
tional Comparisons of Production, Income and Prices at the University of Pennsylvania.
Tamura, Robert. “Income Convergence in an Endogenous Growth Model,” Journal of Political
Economy 99, 1991: 522-540.
Tamura, Robert. “From Decay to Growth: A Demographic Transition to Economic Growth,” Journal
of Economic Dynamics and Control 20, 1996: 1237-1262.
Tamura, Robert. “Human Capital and the Switch from Agriculture to Industry,” Journal of Economic
Dynamics and Control 27, 2002: 207:242.
Tamura, Robert. “Human Capital and Economic Development,” Journal of Development Economics
79, 2006: 26-72.
Tamura, Robert, Dwyer, Gerald P., Devereux, John, and Baier, Scott L. “Data Appendix for Eco-
nomic Growth in the Long Run ”Clemson University working paper, 2011.
Tamura, Robert, Simon, Curtis J. “Secular Fertility Declines, Baby Booms and Economic Growth:
International Evidence,” Clemson University working paper 2012.
Tamura, Robert, Simon, Curtis J., and Murphy, Kevin M. “Black and White Fertility, Differential
Baby Booms: The Value of Civil Rights ”Clemson University working paper 2012.
Tsui, Kevin. “More Oil, Less Democracy: Evidence from Worldwide Crude Oil Discoveries ”Economic
Journal 121, 2011: 89-115.
Turner, Chad, Tamura, Robert, Mulholland, Sean, and Baier, Scott L. “Education and Income of the
States of the United States: 1840-2000 ”Journal of Economic Growth 12, 2007: 101-158.
45
Weil, David G. Economic Growth 2nd edition. Boston: Pearson-Addison-Wesley 2009.
World Bank. World Development Report 2009 The World Bank, 2009.
46
Table 12: Regressions with Model Relative Human Capital: β = .35,.35 ≥ ρ > 0
Hendricks Schoellman
Variable ln(H) ln(H) H H ln(H) ln(H) H H
ln(relative hc) 0.2556*** 0.1084** 0.8282*** 0.7799***
(0.0372) (0.0480) (0.0303) (0.0485)
relative hc 0.7579*** 0.2393 0.9949*** 0.9935***
(0.0940) (0.1513) (0.0389) (0.0698)
constant 0.2198*** 0.1070 0.6752*** 0.8881*** 0.0587 0.1551 0.0945*** (0.1480)
(0.0.0424) (0.1400) (0.0407) (0.1191) (0.0436) (0.1254) (0.0147) (0.0400)
N 73 73 73 73 166 166 166 166
R
2
.3993 .6831 .4780 .6921 .8201 .8495 .7993 .8909
region dummies no yes no yes no yes no yes
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9 Appendix
Appendix Table A1 shows that the data has greatly expanded in depth of coverage relative to BDT. We
list each country by geographic region, as in BDT. We also list the first year of observation for each country
and the additional years of information in this data set compared to BDT.41 In region 1, the Western
Countries, the average initial year of observation is 1827, an increase of 67 years of coverage. We observe
these 18 countries for approximately 180 years. In region 2, Southern Europe, the initial year of observation
is 1859, an increase of 57 years. We now have data for these 7 countries for around 150 years. Although we
now observe an initial year of 1940 for region 3, Central and Eastern Europe, we have added 39 years of data
per country. Central and Eastern Europe is predominated by former Soviet republics, now independent.
In BDT the initial year of observation was 1990. Now for all of these countries we observe them starting in
1970. Furthermore for the countries that were never Soviet republics, we have an average initial observation
year of 1883, and an additional 64 years. All 5 countries in the Newly Industrialized Countries group,
region 4, have an initial year of observation of 1820. We have extended an average of 113 years for these
countries. Our new initial year of observation in Asia, region 5, is 1894, an average extension of 75 years.
Some of this extension arises from the additional countries added to the sample, Afghanistan, Bhutan,
Mongolia, North Korea. However the bulk of the extension arises from the additional years found for
previously observed countries. We were able to start observations in 1820 for China (120 additional years),
India (88 additional years), Indonesia (133 additional years), Malaysia (147 additional years), Myanmar
(128 additional years), Philippines (126 additional years), Sri Lanka (133 additional years), and Thailand
(124 additional years). Thus for the overwhelming bulk of Asian population, we have complete data for
187 years! For region 6, Sub-Saharan Africa, our average initial year of observation is 1946, an additional
27 years of data. Hence even for the continent with the youngest independent countries, we now observe
the typical Sub-Saharan African country for about 6 decades! The new initial year of observation in Latin
America is 1908, bringing an additional 45 years of observations. Here we added 5 additional countries,
Bahamas (1960), Barbados (1960), Belize (1960), Cuba (1930), Suriname (1950). However for the largest
Latin American countries, Argentina (1870), Brazil (1820), Chile (1820), Mexico (1820), Uruguay (1870)
and Venezuela (1820), we now typically observe them starting in 1837, for an additional 76 years. The
Middle East has additional 68 years, and an average starting year of 1910. 42 Finally we now observe all
North African countries, except Libya, starting in 1820. This adds 107 years for the typical North African
country.
41For all countries, except for the defunct East Germany, we now observe them in 2007, instead of 2000. Thus each country
has at least 7 years of additional coverage. All years in excess of 7 indicate either an earlier starting year or countries that
were not covered in BDT.
42Of all the regions, the Middle East is potentially most problematic. This has to do with using modern PPP international
dollars to value past output. Most of the oil producing countries of this region in fact were oil producers as early as 1950, as
can be seen in Tsui (2011). However the real price of oil in 1950 was very different from today. We often times separate out
the oil producers in the Middle East from the rest of the Middle East in the empirical work.
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Table A1: First and Last Observations: By Region
Country 1st yr add’l yrs h15−24 hc k y h15−24 hc k y
Australia 1820 48 0.65 0.56 1757 1426 7.75 7.89 173,135 58,219
Austria 1820 67 0.85 0.83 6490 3027 7.55 6.96 196,239 57,260
Belgium 1820 33 0.97 0.95 7627 3488 7.72 8.21 179,936 62,561
Canada 1820 58 1.15 1.13 7182 3335 9.07 9.86 166,382 57,775
Denmark 1820 57 0.95 0.93 11,173 3356 9.40 9.36 178,662 57,829
Finland 1820 37 0.98 0.96 7840 3344 8.42 8.64 167,853 57,453
France 1800 57 1.00 0.98 6354 3198 6.85 6.85 176,903 59,434
Germany 1800 87 1.00 0.98 9440 3166 7.36 7.45 164,963 50,905
Iceland 1950 57 2.30 2.25 43,697 14,604 7.98 8.12 159,533 56,104
Ireland 1820 113 0.68 0.67 2995 2269 7.63 8.28 146,561 67,201
Luxembourg 1950 57 2.30 2.08 12,710 21,635 5.78 6.54 332,333 161,558
Netherlands 1800 56 1.25 1.62 25,088 5644 11.00 11.77 157,053 50,079
New Zealand 1820 98 0.80 0.78 1084 1140 9.37 9.15 134,738 43,217
Norway 1820 42 0.68 0.66 3390 2200 8.38 8.46 189,625 68,134
Sweden 1800 67 1.05 1.03 16,067 4225 7.84 8.12 161,163 56,463
Switzerland 1820 75 0.87 0.85 8364 2957 7.26 7.40 212,377 53,953
United Kingdom 1801 37 1.20 1.18 15,757 4660 8.64 8.60 155,950 57,195
United States 1790 87 1.15 1.13 5323 2931 10.80 13.94 181,769 76,083
Cyprus 1950 7 0.56 0.46 832 2195 3.85 3.69 89,561 46,136
Greece 1820 97 0.50 0.49 7046 2107 7.18 6.81 129,361 43,620
Italy 1820 48 0.80 0.78 5762 2967 7.58 6.89 195,003 57,195
Malta 1960 47 1.40 0.97 2775 4144 5.49 5.29 109,844 46,810
Portugal 1820 36 0.55 0.54 8600 2387 6.28 5.48 114,874 33,554
Spain 1820 44 0.65 0.64 10,240 2794 7.19 6.74 136,684 42,103
Turkey 1820 122 0.55 0.54 3396 1603 3.85 3.85 44,818 18,125
Albania 1950 47 1.25 1.25 5235 2775 3.37 2.95 40,312 10,471
Armenia 1970 27 2.25 2.24 44,038 19,132 3.68 3.48 51,342 28,255
Azerbaijan 1970 27 2.25 2.24 27,228 11,829 4.17 3.77 34,181 18,205
Belarus 1970 27 2.25 2.24 30,839 13,398 4.79 3.92 64,157 26,022
Bulgaria 1870 71 0.45 0.45 5106 1965 4.65 3.74 99,869 25,099
Continued on Next Page
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Country 1st yr add’l yrs h15−24 hc k y h15−24 hc k y
Czech Republic 1820 108 0.65 0.65 8052 2189 5.82 5.82 137,594 30,060
East Germany 1950 - 2.50 2.82 10,837 8892 2.66 3.35 40,844 12,113
Estonia 1970 27 2.18 2.01 46,255 20,095 4.86 3.87 140,428 46,814
Georgia 1970 27 4.50 6.94 36,399 15,813 5.51 5.59 30,606 13,723
Hungary 1869 28 0.70 0.69 8408 3030 6.16 5.46 91,401 26,659
Kazakhstan 1970 27 4.20 3.89 44,417 19,297 5.36 5.35 48,936 24,968
Kyrgyzstan 1970 27 4.20 6.16 23,746 10,316 5.17 4.93 16,916 7311
Latvia 1970 27 2.00 1.82 40,323 17,528 4.81 3.55 90,931 37,751
Lithuania 1970 27 4.50 4.13 42,808 18,598 6.09 5.64 71,336 28,852
Moldova 1970 27 4.50 4.16 29,958 13,015 4.97 5.36 28,385 8133
Poland 1870 68 0.52 0.52 6988 2102 6.28 5.27 80,519 26,448
Romania 1870 67 0.82 0.82 5653 1853 4.20 3.48 51,973 11,804
Russia 1820 104 0.36 0.36 6014 1686 5.27 3.63 48,661 20,465
Slovak Republic 1990 7 2.16 3.20 61,357 20,238 5.05 4.68 105,066 31,841
Tajikistan 1970 27 4.20 6.06 33,208 14,427 5.09 5.20 14,771 5552
Turkmenistan 1970 27 4.20 6.18 70,681 13,781 5.08 5.20 46,457 10,026
Ukraine 1970 27 4.50 7.04 27,229 11,8290 5.78 5.65 37,133 12,492
Uzbekistan 1970 27 4.20 6.17 39,875 17,323 5.08 5.21 41,597 13,539
Yugoslavia 1910 17 0.40 0.40 12,943 2610 2.41 2.39 61,041 16,412
Hong Kong 1820 147 0.38 0.37 1460 1675 5.03 6.05 190,088 73,162
Japan 1820 77 0.85 0.83 2317 1783 7.63 9.12 226,158 54,457
Singapore 1820 150 0.38 0.37 1392 1779 5.54 5.72 193,930 66,158
South Korea 1820 97 0.60 0.59 3022 2176 6.96 6.01 151,921 47,572
Taiwan 1820 113 0.38 0.37 1411 1503 6.00 5.57 111.713 55,657
Afghanistan 1950 57 1.25 1.17 2976 2482 1.25 1.17 2155 2171
Bangladesh 1950 27 1.00 0.93 1608 1190 1.80 1.72 4355 3007
Bhutan 1980 27 0.12 0.12 663 1416 0.76 0.50 7743 7000
Cambodia 1950 37 0.50 0.47 1479 1120 1.76 1.67 4786 4542
China 1820 120 1.00 0.93 5983 2006 3.64 3.39 35,811 14,558
Fiji 1960 7 4.00 3.93 29,742 11,757 4.00 5.07 41,830 9529
India 1820 88 1.00 0.94 4852 1388 3.09 2.84 15,819 8845
Indonesia 1820 138 1.00 0.94 6163 2208 3.62 3.37 25,884 10,597
Continued on Next Page
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Country 1st yr add’l yrs h15−24 hc k y h15−24 hc k y
Laos 1950 37 0.75 0.70 2801 1649 1.64 1.64 11,431 4862
Malaysia 1820 147 1.00 0.94 2611 1991 4.59 4.30 74,354 28,061
Mongolia 1950 57 1.50 1.40 3391 1162 4.00 3.95 18,178 3825
Myanmar 1820 128 1.00 0.94 2440 1103 2.47 2.31 7554 6063
Nepal 1950 17 1.75 1.64 1236 1123 2.21 2.49 7829 3451
North Korea 1820 187 1.00 0.93 1580 1628 3.74 3.51 23,884 3125
Pakistan 1950 8 1.00 0.94 3239 2796 1.28 1.42 12,444 7753
Papua New Guinea 1960 7 2.50 2.45 5024 2655 2.50 3.29 12,367 4792
Philippines 1820 126 1.00 0.94 5878 1875 5.14 4.75 21,174 8032
Sri Lanka 1820 133 1.00 0.94 2470 1717 4.58 4.27 27,570 13,512
Thailand 1820 124 0.75 0.70 4047 1465 4.71 4.35 58,223 18,890
Vietnam 1950 37 0.50 0.49 1846 1370 2.28 1.82 9485 6442
Angola 1950 17 1.00 0.99 6262 2553 1.13 1.34 10,462 4160
Benin 1950 17 0.58 0.58 7648 2485 1.54 1.30 6181 4360
Botswana 1950 17 0.12 0.12 1387 975 2.54 2.07 5,2887 22,499
Burkina Faso 1950 17 0.42 0.42 589 1008 0.74 0.75 4372 3086
Burundi 1950 17 0.85 0.84 422 728 1.07 1.15 867 1229
Cameroon 1950 17 1.22 1.21 1929 1757 2.07 2.24 4345 3811
Cape Verde 1950 57 0.38 0.38 5000 2663 1.95 1.53 15,795 6793
Cent. Afr. Rep. 1950 17 1.50 1.49 2293 1638 1.50 1.82 2411 1832
Chad 1950 17 1.50 1.49 733 1142 1.50 1.77 2456 1622
Comoros 1950 57 1.22 1.21 2737 1512 1.51 1.75 2704 2094
Congo 1950 17 1.40 1.39 4917 3130 2.68 3.14 7982 6817
Djibouti 1950 57 1.50 1.49 2387 3081 1.50 1.80 7252 3483
Equitorial Guinea 57 1950 0.26 0.26 568 1628 1.76 1.67 74,470 31,388
Eritrea 1990 17 0.60 0.56 3862 1410 0.92 0.85 7001 2288
Ethiopia 1950 7 0.46 0.46 405 885 1.06 0.92 1323 2265
Gabon 1950 17 1.50 1.49 14,374 6336 2.69 2.71 27,045 10,763
Gambia 1950 17 1.20 1.19 1296 1424 1.63 1.60 3753 2706
Ghana 1870 97 0.48 0.45 2909 1111 1.88 2.04 4821 4298
Guinea 1950 17 0.67 0.67 470 883 1.10 1.00 863 1523
Guinea-Bissau 1950 17 0.58 0.58 1054 657 1.14 1.07 6631 1962
Continued on Next Page
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Country 1st yr add’l yrs h15−24 hc k y h15−24 hc k y
Ivory Coast 1950 17 1.50 1.49 4590 2925 1.55 1.81 7062 3969
Kenya 1950 19 1.45 1.44 3287 1586 3.01 3.17 4421 3156
Lesotho 1950 17 0.74 0.74 907 975 2.24 2.36 25,000 6920
Liberia 1950 17 1.37 1.36 6233 2829 1.91 1.84 8897 4018
Madagascar 1950 17 1.50 1.49 1637 2254 1.67 1.98 1508 2215
Malawi 1950 17 1.27 1.26 1102 806 2.24 1.96 4480 1907
Mali 1950 17 0.31 0.31 698 993 0.87 0.78 3312 3345
Mauritania 1950 17 0.27 0.27 3837 1201 1.10 0.92 8969 3876
Mauritius 1950 17 1.10 1.09 19,018 10,480 3.67 3.33 49,029 32,824
Mozambique 1950 17 0.56 0.56 2188 2867 1.11 1.08 3033 5417
Namibia 1950 17 1.07 1.06 11,923 6814 2.34 2.15 41,220 18,015
Niger 1950 17 1.50 1.49 1584 1541 1.50 1.73 2429 1541
Nigeria 1950 19 1.10 1.09 2165 2274 1.84 1.71 6455 5360
Reunion 1950 57 1.50 1.49 19,569 4829 3.48 3.64 34,148 10,563
Rwanda 1950 17 0.80 0.79 715 1201 2.09 1.83 1355 2777
Senegal 1950 17 1.26 1.25 2307 3256 1.46 1.59 3833 4805
Seychelles 1950 57 1.50 1.49 16,170 5571 3.47 3.74 86,801 18,317
Sierra Leone 1950 18 1.38 1.37 2079 1949 2.16 1.96 869 1939
Somalia 1950 17 1.50 1.49 9701 2331 1.50 1.74 2988 1207
South Africa 1820 133 0.33 0.31 3005 1162 3.51 3.19 26,433 14,826
Sudan 1950 27 0.64 0.64 4621 2523 1.04 1.06 15,893 5710
Swaziland 1950 57 0.47 0.47 5234 2220 2.59 2.39 29,453 12,671
Tanzania 1950 17 0.74 0.74 1581 924 1.36 1.42 2498 1812
Togo 1950 17 1.50 1.49 3940 1522 2.27 2.44 6113 1924
Uganda 1950 16 1.00 0.99 7135 1589 1.74 1.60 11,104 2756
Zaire 1950 7 1.50 1.49 1565 1306 1.81 2.18 645 746
Zambia 1950 7 1.50 1.49 4062 1730 2.14 2.45 6882 2271
Zimbabwe 1950 7 1.50 1.49 3561 1839 2.81 3.13 9313 2424
Argentina 1870 32 1.45 1.42 6246 2996 5.51 4.35 58,792 26,444
Bahamas 1960 47 3.50 3.43 53,482 38,359 4.67 5.05 97,789 31,675
Barbados 1960 47 1.55 1.51 18,214 10,464 4.80 3.97 56,083 30,966
Belize 1960 47 3.50 3.43 14,017 7913 3.75 4.39 40,524 14,582
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Bolivia 1880 77 1.45 1.41 2460 1570 4.19 2.98 16,964 7622
Brazil 1820 59 1.20 1.17 8528 2387 3.68 3.12 36,529 15,845
Chile 1820 82 1.20 1.17 3323 2468 4.80 4.14 93,929 39,093
Colombia 1890 34 1.45 1.41 30,268 4797 2.79 2.64 33,022 15,420
Costa Rica 1920 38 0.90 0.88 10,389 5118 2.88 2.89 42,301 20,274
Cuba 1930 77 1.60 1.56 34,064 5218 3.76 3.44 13,162 7367
Dominican Republic 1950 7 1.25 1.23 4116 3362 3.25 3.03 29,455 13,422
Ecuador 1940 17 2.30 2.26 10,766 4413 3.54 3.73 31,188 9797
El Salvador 1920 37 1.50 1.47 8484 3419 3.76 3.34 18,147 8754
Guatemala 1921 36 0.75 0.74 9271 4969 2.01 1.83 29,777 15,905
Guyana 1946 7 1.80 1.76 20,753 3905 3.28 3.47 30,498 7705
Haiti 1940 12 3.00 2.94 5806 2362 3.00 4.10 4705 2012
Honduras 1920 17 3.50 3.44 8282 4667 3.50 4.40 19,910 6430
Jamaica 1820 140 1.20 1.17 14,535 2149 4.03 3.63 44,589 10,589
Mexico 1820 82 1.20 1.17 8484 1906 3.40 3.05 74,071 24,467
Nicaragua 1920 37 3.50 3.44 10,594 4240 3.50 4.32 17,523 5341
Panama 1940 12 1.50 1.47 20,090 7089 3.89 3.67 50,700 19,612
Paraguay 1939 7 3.50 3.43 27,434 7627 3.56 4.49 22,835 8460
Peru 1900 15 0.63 1.32 3523 2106 3.37 3.10 34,070 12,785
Puerto Rico 1950 17 1.55 1.52 10,904 8654 4.68 4.58 104,931 43,086
Surname 1950 57 1.10 1.03 20,931 6724 3.02 2.68 55,968 19,929
Trinidad 1946 21 1.15 1.13 6801 10,455 3.61 3.53 104,148 61,656
Uruguay 1870 76 1.50 1.46 25,151 6938 4.64 3.65 53,557 23,364
Venezuela 1820 123 1.20 1.22 4706 1761 3.15 2.99 65,331 25,453
Bahrain 1950 57 0.95 0.93 15,774 6001 4.05 3.50 34,722 16,357
Iran 1820 143 0.26 0.25 8333 2312 2.73 2.28 67,896 19,484
Iraq 1820 137 0.20 0.20 9114 2685 2.24 2.28 11,337 9831
Israel 1948 7 1.95 1.41 13,570 10,409 5.79 4.69 139,324 53,057
Jordan 1950 17 2.35 2.35 20,830 11,026 4.24 3.83 40,833 18,840
Kuwait 1950 37 2.50 2.50 101,042 69,625 3.04 3.72 35,718 23,238
Lebanon 1820 187 1.10 1.07 10,090 2823 4.04 3.53 41,330 11,852
Oman 1950 27 0.20 0.20 2994 2860 1.69 1.42 30,761 26,662
Continued on Next Page
53
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Qatar 1950 57 2.50 2.45 151,261 102,853 4.19 4.27 78,955 36,275
Saudi Arabia 1950 17 0.75 0.74 13,689 9157 2.28 1.95 55,706 31,330
Syria 1820 140 0.42 0.41 7528 3347 2.52 2.62 42,497 24,550
UAE 1950 37 2.50 2.45 159,188 81,144 3.40 3.80 97,567 40,150
Yemen 1950 27 0.45 0.44 3306 2636 2.04 1.64 17,455 11,789
Algeria 1820 135 0.36 0.35 4253 1312 3.54 3.03 38,066 10,294
Egypt 1820 104 0.36 0.35 2723 1394 3.78 2.98 20,631 13,809
Libya 1950 17 2.20 2.16 11,285 3760 5.22 4.30 41,136 8838
Morocco 1820 138 0.35 0.35 3729 1539 1.92 2.01 25,483 11,100
Tunisia 1820 143 0.35 0.35 3264 1565 3.77 3.06 47,400 19,014
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Table A2: Growth Variance Decomposition: Plausible Bounds
Region N s¯x S¯x s¯tfp S¯tfp avg Sx avg Stfp BDTx BDTtfp
World 168 .210 .790 .210 .790 .500 .500 .22 .78
(WC) W. Countries 18 .112 .957 .043 .888 .535 .465 .46 .54
(SE) S. Europe 7 .006 .998 .002 .994 .502 .498 .50 .50
(CEE) C. & E. Europe 24 .110 .713 .287 .890 .412 .588 .28 .72
(NIC) N. I. C. 5 .063 .502 .498 .937 .283 .717 .64 .36
(Asia) Asia 20 .196 .802 .198 .804 .499 .501 .40 .60
(SSA) Sub-Saharan Africa 48 .172 .862 .138 .828 .517 .483 .37 .63
(LA) Latin America 28 .401 .591 .409 .599 .496 .504 .22 .78
(ME) Middle East 13 .137 .919 .081 .863 .528 .472 .44 .56
(ME) ME not OPEC 4 .398 .803 .197 .602 .601 .399
(ME) ME OPEC 9 .110 .938 .062 .890 .524 .476
(NA) North Africa 5 .512 .704 .296 .488 .608 .392 .84 .16
larger regions
(1): WC & SE 25 .032 .991 .009 .968 .512 .488
(2): (1) & NIC 30 .037 .990 .010 .963 .513 .487
(3): (2) & NA 35 .255 .904 .096 .745 .580 .420
(4); (3) & SSA 83 .208 .845 .155 .792 .526 .474
(5): (4) & Asia 103 .206 .835 .165 .794 .520 .480
(6); (5) & CEE 127 .183 .804 .196 .817 .493 .507
(7): (6) & LA 155 .207 .778 .222 .793 .492 .508
(8): (7) & ME no OPEC 159 .209 .778 .222 .791 .494 .506
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Table A3: Growth Variance Decomposition: Plausible Bounds, New Human Capital β = .35, ρ = 0
Region N s¯x S¯x s¯tfp S¯tfp avg Sx avg Stfp
World 168 .586 .885 .115 .414 .736 .264
(WC) W. Countries 18 .240 .970 .030 .760 .605 .395
(SE) S. Europe 7 .030 .999 .001 .970 .514 .486
(CEE) C. & E. Europe 24 .619 .836 .164 .381 .727 .273
(NIC) N. I. C. 5 .906 .966 .034 .094 .936 .064
(Asia) Asia 20 .8874 .9200 .0800 .1126 .9037 .0963
(SSA) Sub-Saharan Africa 48 .4854 .9283 .0717 .5146 .7068 .2932
(LA) Latin America 28 .4462 .6504 .3496 .5538 .5483 .4517
(ME) Middle East 13 .2261 .9433 .0567 .7739 .5847 .4153
(ME) ME not OPEC 4 .0373 .9967 .0033 .9627 .5170 .4830
(ME) ME OPEC 9 .1640 .9652 .0348 .8360 .5646 .4354
(NA) North Africa 5 .7227 .9520 .0480 .2773 .8374 .1626
larger regions
(1): WC & SE 25 .2566 .9902 .0098 .7434 .6234 .3766
(2): (1) & NIC 30 .3248 .9863 .0137 .6752 .6556 .3444
(3): (2) & NA 35 .4241 .9708 .0292 .5759 .6974 .3026
(4): (3) & SSA 83 .4595 .9416 .0584 .5405 .7006 .2994
(5): (4) & Asia 103 .6199 .9221 .0779 .3801 .7710 .2290
(6); (5) & CEE 127 .6493 .9058 .0942 .3507 .7775 .2225
(7): (6) & LA 155 .6415 .8842 .1158 .3585 .7629 .2371
(7); (6) & ME no OPEC 159 .6386 .8852 .1148 .3614 .7619 .2381
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Table A4: Growth Variance Decomposition: Plausible Bounds, New Human Capital β = .35, .35 ≥ ρ > 0
Region N s¯x S¯x s¯tfp S¯tfp avg Sx avg Stfp
World 168 .743 .907 .093 .257 .825 .175
(WC) W. Countries 18 .977 .994 .006 .023 .986 .014
(SE) S. Europe 7 .913 1.000 .000 .087 .956 .044
(CEE) C. & E. Europe 24 .477 .880 .120 .523 .678 .322
(NIC) N. I. C. 5 .914 .949 .051 .086 .932 .068
(Asia) Asia 20 .916 .999 .001 .084 .958 .042
(SSA) Sub-Saharan Africa 48 .742 .952 .048 .258 .847 .153
(LA) Latin America 28 .720 .822 .178 .280 .771 .229
(ME) Middle East 13 .306 .946 .054 .694 .626 .374
ME not OPEC 4 .990 .995 .005 .010 .993 .007
ME OPEC 9 .228 .961 .039 .772 .594 .406
(NA) North Africa 5 .501 .825 .175 .499 .663 .337
larger regions
(1): WC & SE 25 .959 .998 .002 .041 .979 .021
(2): (1) & NIC 30 .974 .998 .002 .026 .986 .014
(3): (2) & NA 35 .981 .998 .002 .019 .993 .007
(4): (3) & SSA 83 .794 .959 .041 .206 .876 .124
(5): (4) & Asia 103 .896 .946 .054 .104 .921 .079
(6); (5) & CEE 127 .787 .928 .072 .213 .858 .142
(7): (6) & LA 155 .807 .909 .091 .193 .858 .142
(7); (6) & ME no OPEC 159 .809 .910 .090 .191 .860 .140
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Table A5: Relative Output per Worker, Human Capital, and School Quality Measures
Country y Hendricks r15−241990 r
25−34
1990 r
35−44
1990 y Schoellman r
15−24
2000 r
25−34
2000 r
35−44
2000
Australia 84.2 131.3 60.6 62.0 52.1 75.2 67.6 63.0 56.7 59.3
Austria 77.0 126.3 56.5 45.9 38.6 80.0 70.2 63.6 55.0 43.8
Belgium 96.0 126.5 64.2 64.5 51.0 87.6 70.3 68.1 62.4 62.9
Canada 75.9 125.8 81.6 67.3 54.1 75.6 89.9 92.6 81.8 65.7
Denmark 69.4 131.4 74.7 68.5 55.0 74.4 79.4 75.5 74.3 67.3
Finland 76.9 66.0 65.5 51.2 69.2 84.3 72.9 64.8 64.6
France 98.6 126.5 56.7 50.5 39.6 84.3 65.5 61.4 53.1 48.1
Germany 86.9 117.0 61.8 54.3 38.8 68.6 69.3 66.0 60.9 52.7
Iceland* 70.8 63.5 63.1 47.2 65.4 68.7 62.9 62.2 62.0
Ireland 67.8 119.3 66.2 61.8 52.5 91.8 69.5 66.1 64.7 59.9
Luxembourg* 113.4 57.0 46.2 46.9 163.5 56.0 53.0 54.9 43.6
Netherlands 83.7 110.2 89.3 85.9 73.7 82.8 104.9 95.5 90.1 86.1
New Zealand 69.4 126.2 69.8 68.0 62.2 58.0 77.4 71.9 66.2 65.4
Norway 78.6 131.0 64.5 66.0 51.0 88.9 69.0 70.8 62.9 64.4
Sweden 71.0 129.2 63.4 65.1 50.4 68.2 63.8 65.0 61.8 63.7
Switzerland 78.7 131.4 56.9 54.7 47.4 73.8 56.8 64.8 54.7 52.2
United Kingdom 74.9 130.5 66.9 65.5 57.5 71.6 71.5 66.2 65.1 63.9
average 84.1 124.4 65.1 59.9 48.1 75.4 72.7 69.3 63.6 58.4
Cyprus 34.2 28.9 28.0 21.2 56.2 45.7 29.7 27.2 26.7
Greece 56.1 102.6 54.5 51.4 39.2 49.8 59.0 59.0 52.3 49.2
Italy 91.8 119.1 54.3 52.8 37.4 75.2 69.2 57.8 52.4 50.9
Malta* 50.5 43.5 37.3 25.2 60.8 55.4 48.1 41.5 35.4
Portugal 48.1 109.4 42.3 41.8 32.0 48.5 47.9 46.2 39.9 39.7
Spain 68.9 105.5 59.3 45.4 32.2 64.1 77.3 61.4 58.3 43.2
Turkey 26.1 107.0 30.8 31.2 20.4 24.7 37.4 34.3 28.2 28.9
average 60.7 110.6 47.1 43.4 30.5 51.9 57.8 49.5 44.3 40.6
Albania* 11.0 22.4 21.8 19.1 10.0 40.2 30.9 12.5 10.5
Armenia* 26.6 30.2 31.1 32.5 14.6 56.9 37.3 16.8 13.9
Azerbaijan 23.3 32.1 33.2 33.3 9.7 71.0 42.4 18.7 14.6
Belarus 28.6 31.9 32.7 33.1 21.4 71.5 45.2 18.5 14.4
Bulgaria 23.6 33.0 37.0 33.0 17.6 60.7 39.8 19.1 16.3
Czech Republic 36.5 100.5 36.1 40.9 43.6 28.9 61.4 54.9 34.6 38.8
East Germany 20.8 31.5 33.6 33.0
Estonia* 44.7 31.0 31.5 32.1 39.0 66.2 43.4 17.8 13.9
Georgia 43.4 53.2 62.0 66.8 11.6 71.9 56.1 31.2 27.2
Hungary 24.4 100.4 34.1 38.6 37.2 25.8 54.9 48.2 32.8 37.4
Kazakhstan* 32.7 49.7 57.6 61.8 23.1 75.1 54.4 28.8 25.4
Kyrgyzstan* 18.1 49.7 54.7 56.1 8.5 39.9 37.2 27.7 26.0
Latvia 38.0 29.9 30.9 29.5 25.4 64.0 39.5 17.2 13.6
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Country y Hendricks r15−241990 r
25−34
1990 r
35−44
1990 y Schoellman r
15−24
2000 r
25−34
2000 r
35−44
2000
Lithuania 35.1 53.2 62.3 67.4 21.5 68.5 52.6 31.3 27.1
Moldova* 27.1 53.2 61.0 64.8 7.8 65.1 50.5 30.1 27.4
Poland 27.1 92.3 32.5 35.4 30.2 25.0 63.1 51.0 31.5 34.3
Romania 17.8 97.8 31.3 33.0 31.8 11.2 52.3 34.8 17.7 14.9
Russia 29.2 93.0 37.2 38.8 34.5 17.7 80.3 27.0 23.2 17.1
Slovak Republic 34.8 25.5 28.9 30.8 26.7 57.6 48.9 24.6 27.9
Tajikistan* 17.4 49.7 57.8 62.2 4.2 75.4 51.8 29.0 25.4
Turkmenistan* 23.9 49.7 57.8 62.2 8.1 73.7 51.7 29.0 25.4
Ukraine 5.5 53.2 62.0 66.8 9.6 70.8 56.1 31.2 27.2
Uzbekistan 22.9 49.7 57.6 61.8 14.7 74.6 51.7 28.8 25.4
Yugoslavia 33.2 111.3 24.1 22.9 19.2 15.3 45.5 24.3 13.4 10.9
average 28.8 94.8 35.5 37.3 33.4 17.0 70.5 40.4 25.5 22.1
Hong Kong 70.3 98.3 48.1 40.9 35.5 82.3 47.3 50.5 45.8 38.3
Japan 80.7 136.4 71.2 75.7 58.4 69.6 71.1 69.3 69.8 74.8
Singapore 62.4 43.6 39.3 34.0 83.4 49.2 46.1 41.4 34.0
South Korea 43.6 77.6 45.8 36.6 28.2 48.9 61.4 52.5 43.8 34.8
Taiwan 51.4 99.4 42.2 40.8 31.8 68.2 49.8 44.9 39.7 38.5
average 69.1 118.3 61.8 62.3 48.2 65.4 65.3 61.8 59.2 59.8
Afghanistan 3.0 14.8 11.2 9.3 2.3 10.7 12.4 9.4 8.3
Bangladesh 2.8 78.8 12.9 14.2 14.0 2.9 18.2 12.3 13.0 12.3
Bhutan* 3.7 3.8 1.7 1.1 4.1 8.8 3.6 3.7 1.4
Cambodia 2.7 15.0 11.4 9.4 3.9 22.2 17.3 13.0 11.6
China 6.6 77.3 25.0 19.0 15.7 10.2 30.0 22.4 16.9 15.0
Fiji 28.3 81.4 47.3 51.7 53.7 31.1 37.8 39.7 40.6 47.5
India 6.6 97.5 26.3 19.9 16.5 7.6 27.8 28.3 21.3 18.9
Indonesia 12.3 96.7 30.1 22.9 18.9 12.9 34.3 31.2 23.5 20.9
Laos 3.3 15.0 12.1 9.8 4.7 21.2 13.7 14.2 10.5
Malaysia 26.9 93.5 32.3 24.5 20.3 33.1 35.0 37.8 28.5 25.3
Mongolia* 5.6 36.3 32.9 22.6 3.6 58.1 38.7 28.9 31.7
Myanmar 3.0 21.6 16.4 13.6 4.6 21.4 22.1 16.6 14.8
Nepal 3.3 20.7 24.3 23.0 4.1 19.4 19.6 20.9 20.7
North Korea* 11.4 39.5 30.0 24.8 3.6 40.1 38.0 28.6 25.4
Pakistan 10.2 81.9 11.8 14.2 12.6 8.9 14.7 9.9 11.4 12.3
Papua New Guinea* 6.3 29.6 35.5 34.9 6.3 18.5 24.8 29.0 31.4
Philippines 12.9 76.4 48.1 36.5 30.2 11.0 54.4 48.0 36.2 32.2
Sri Lanka 15.5 100.0 42.5 32.3 26.7 14.7 47.3 42.0 31.7 28.2
Thailand 17.8 83.0 35.8 27.2 22.5 19.0 34.6 33.7 25.4 22.6
Vietnam 3.5 16.7 10.3 8.1 6.3 26.5 14.2 14.9 8.9
average 7.6 86.0 25.6 19.9 16.6 9.2 28.9 24.8 19.2 17.1
Angola* 3.8 13.5 12.3 11.0 2.3 18.2 11.3 11.9 10.7
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25−34
1990 r
35−44
1990 y Schoellman r
15−24
2000 r
25−34
2000 r
35−44
2000
Benin* 5.3 10.9 8.6 7.0 5.2 17.2 9.4 9.7 7.4
Botswana* 16.4 15.0 8.3 5.2 17.1 38.0 17.5 13.8 7.4
Burkina Faso* 3.3 6.8 6.3 5.4 3.5 10.6 6.8 5.7 5.3
Burundi* 2.8 10.1 10.2 9.6 1.4 14.1 10.6 8.5 8.8
Cameroon 6.4 20.1 17.5 14.9 4.9 27.8 19.5 18.4 15.8
Cape Verde 7.1 13.7 8.8 7.3 7.1 27.3 13.8 12.4 7.7
Central African Republic* 2.7 17.7 18.6 17.2 2.0 17.6 14.9 15.7 16.3
Chad* 1.8 17.7 18.0 16.8 1.7 13.3 14.9 15.1 15.4
Comoros* 3.2 17.9 14.7 13.6 2.3 20.9 15.0 16.2 12.6
Congo* 12.3 32.3 22.1 17.5 8.4 42.2 27.2 30.8 20.3
Djibouti* 5.1 17.7 18.1 17.1 4.6 12.1 14.9 15.2 15.5
Equitorial Guinea* 8.8 15.7 12.5 6.9 36.5 25.8 13.2 14.5 11.4
Eritrea 2.4 7.1 5.4 4.5 2.2 11.1 6.5 7.0 4.6
Ethiopia 2.7 73.8 7.8 6.7 5.5 2.5 11.2 7.0 6.6 5.7
Gabon* 24.6 21.9 21.8 19.4 13.8 32.1 22.4 20.0 20.0
Gambia* 3.5 14.2 14.4 13.4 3.1 15.0 12.7 12.3 12.3
Ghana 4.8 70.4 18.4 15.7 12.5 4.8 30.0 16.4 16.6 14.1
Guinea* 2.2 8.8 8.7 7.5 2.2 12.0 7.5 7.5 7.5
Guinea-Bissau* 3.3 10.0 8.7 6.7 2.6 14.1 8.5 8.7 7.4
Ivory Coast* 7.7 17.7 18.5 17.5 6.0 18.9 14.9 15.7 16.1
Kenya 5.2 99.0 28.1 23.1 18.4 3.6 36.7 25.4 26.4 21.3
Lesotho* 6.6 20.5 16.5 14.4 7.1 35.2 21.2 18.9 15.0
Liberia 5.4 16.2 16.4 15.7 4.4 15.5 13.6 14.2 14.0
Madagascar* 3.6 19.1 19.0 17.7 2.7 19.9 16.8 17.2 17.0
Malawi* 2.9 15.0 15.5 15.1 2.4 20.2 13.8 13.3 13.5
Mali* 3.1 6.9 6.4 4.9 3.2 10.1 6.1 5.9 5.4
Mauritania* 4.1 7.4 5.9 4.6 4.0 13.4 7.5 6.3 5.0
Mauritius* 40.3 26.1 21.8 19.3 54.9 44.0 26.2 24.4 20.1
Mozambique* 4.9 10.4 8.0 7.6 5.1 14.6 8.7 9.1 6.9
Namibia* 17.0 12.7 13.3 12.9 6.4 40.7 21.9 11.0 11.7
Niger* 2.3 17.7 17.8 16.4 .7 10.4 14.9 15.0 14.9
Nigeria 6.3 67.1 14.5 13.7 12.2 5.5 21.1 12.7 12.9 12.2
Reunion* 18.1 31.5 27.0 21.9 14.9 43.8 34.8 29.8 25.2
Rwanda* 3.6 13.5 14.5 10.6 2.3 22.3 13.7 12.0 13.0
Senegal 6.1 14.9 15.4 14.4 5.7 16.1 12.5 12.9 13.4
Seychelles* 25.5 35.0 25.6 26.1 27.5 46.9 30.8 33.3 23.8
Sierra Leone 6.0 16.3 16.8 15.7 2.0 16.9 13.7 14.3 14.5
Somalia 5.0 17.7 17.7 16.4 2.7 10.6 14.9 15.1 14.8
South Africa 23.4 135.9 23.0 24.7 22.4 18.1 42.2 32.2 21.1 22.8
Sudan 4.4 9.6 9.0 7.3 5.0 15.2 9.1 8.3 7.8
Swaziland* 15.0 20.4 15.2 9.2 12.8 41.9 21.4 19.1 14.0
Continued on Next Page
60
Country y Hendricks r15−241990 r
25−34
1990 r
35−44
1990 y Schoellman r
15−24
2000 r
25−34
2000 r
35−44
2000
Tanzania 2.0 14.8 9.0 8.4 1.9 18.3 12.4 13.3 7.7
Togo* 4.2 23.6 18.7 17.6 2.9 29.2 19.8 21.8 16.6
Uganda 2.5 11.8 12.2 12.1 3.0 19.5 13.2 10.3 10.6
Zaire* 2.4 21.7 20.0 18.2 1.0 25.0 18.2 19.8 18.2
Zambia* 4.0 21.6 23.7 18.6 2.6 46.5 21.1 19.6 21.9
Zimbabwe 6.4 28.7 19.2 19.6 4.6 46.5 28.5 26.9 17.4
average 8.3 84.1 16.3 15.3 13.2 4.8 22.1 14.9 14.2 12.9
Argentina 34.6 78.6 41.5 31.8 26.5 37.6 58.2 43.9 32.3 30.2
Bahamas 65.8 51.4 43.2 45.9 50.7 54.9 47.4 40.0 40.4
Barbados 34.9 95.5 35.3 28.3 22.8 30.2 56.3 36.8 28.3 26.9
Belize 26.3 84.6 41.4 43.2 45.6 22.0 41.3 34.7 35.3 40.4
Bolivia 12.6 78.6 25.7 20.0 16.0 11.0 136.7 23.8 22.0 18.5
Brazil 24.9 94.1 29.0 23.4 16.8 21.5 40.0 27.6 24.1 21.7
Chile 39.6 90.7 36.8 30.9 24.7 45.0 59.5 41.0 29.3 29.6
Colombia 22.7 83.9 22.8 20.7 18.1 19.5 34.4 22.9 20.4 18.9
Costa Rica 29.4 86.4 27.5 22.3 18.3 28.1 41.9 25.4 23.2 20.8
Cuba 13.7 33.3 23.1 21.8 8.6 44.2 31.2 27.3 21.1
Dominican Republic 19.7 79.1 27.0 23.1 18.9 15.3 42.0 26.5 23.0 21.3
Ecuador 26.3 82.2 40.3 28.9 26.8 15.1 47.6 33.8 32.3 26.8
El Salvador 11.7 74.7 25.8 26.7 25.2 11.2 34.3 24.8 22.8 25.0
Guatemala 29.5 75.9 14.5 13.1 11.0 24.3 24.2 14.7 14.0 11.6
Guyana 8.5 88.7 32.0 30.0 28.6 14.6 38.9 26.8 26.9 28.2
Haiti 4.8 72.7 35.5 35.3 37.7 2.9 17.7 29.8 41.6 30.7
Honduras 14.1 73.0 41.4 46.8 42.3 10.7 32.6 34.7 37.4 42.4
Jamaica 20.2 90.4 33.2 27.3 21.0 12.5 51.0 30.0 27.0 25.7
Mexico 43.3 76.5 28.1 23.2 18.2 32.4 44.0 27.2 23.6 21.5
Nicaragua 12.7 66.5 41.4 47.5 47.0 6.5 37.4 34.7 35.9 42.8
Panama 28.7 90.6 34.9 27.9 23.9 24.5 51.4 32.6 28.2 26.2
Paraguay 16.1 41.4 44.7 43.5 14.6 33.9 34.7 36.0 41.3
Peru 18.5 77.3 27.5 21.0 16.9 9.0 48.2 30.8 23.0 19.6
Puerto Rico 69.2 85.3 45.0 35.3 30.7 65.7 68.3 43.6 34.3 34.3
Surname* 17.0 22.0 18.5 15.5 12.7 68.3 24.0 19.5 16.7
Trinidad 48.6 33.9 27.8 22.2 49.5 53.4 33.3 27.5 26.3
Uruguay 33.8 96.3 33.0 25.5 21.3 31.5 54.6 39.0 27.1 24.0
Venezuela 46.5 89.2 27.0 23.3 20.8 35.7 39.8 25.3 23.1 21.6
average 29.8 85.2 29.8 24.7 19.8 24.9 42.5 29.1 25.1 23.0
Bahrain* 19.5 27.3 23.3 16.4 20.0 36.7 37.2 22.7 21.8
Iran 29.6 91.2 17.8 14.5 9.6 28.3 37.1 19.3 15.9 13.1
Iraq 20.4 88.3 18.9 17.9 10.7 7.6 40.7 21.4 17.0 16.2
Israel 67.7 109.7 45.0 33.8 27.6 62.4 62.4 45.9 34.3 32.8
Jordan 29.0 91.3 29.6 31.8 32.2 24.1 32.3 24.8 26.0 28.7
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Country y Hendricks r15−241990 r
25−34
1990 r
35−44
1990 y Schoellman r
15−24
2000 r
25−34
2000 r
35−44
2000
Kuwait 33.1 35.9 31.6 33.7 44.9 29.9 30.1 30.0 29.4
Lebanon 13.1 31.1 24.5 19.8 17.3 50.9 33.2 25.3 23.0
Oman* 48.8 8.4 6.1 4.8 48.3 21.7 15.7 8.5 5.1
Qatar* 25.1 39.4 31.5 35.2 34.1 25.7 41.0 32.2 29.3
Saudi Arabia 62.5 13.3 11.8 9.7 44.0 21.4 17.3 12.9 10.3
Syria 48.5 106.2 27.0 20.1 14.0 41.9 44.6 25.2 21.3 18.4
UAE 48.1 33.7 32.7 34.8 50.0 18.1 34.5 28.8 29.9
Yemen 14.0 10.8 8.9 6.9 14.7 22.1 15.0 10.7 7.6
average 32.3 93.6 21.0 17.4 12.1 29.0 35.1 21.4 17.2 14.9
Algeria 17.7 22.8 15.0 10.9 17.3 43.6 25.6 19.2 13.7
Egypt 16.1 93.7 20.4 16.6 14.0 15.5 48.6 29.9 18.2 15.2
Libya* 22.8 34.8 28.8 31.1 14.1 45.0 32.0 29.1 26.3
Morocco 16.0 13.7 11.2 10.5 12.4 20.6 12.3 13.0 9.7
Tunisia* 19.8 20.3 17.6 15.5 20.6 38.9 23.6 17.9 16.3
average 16.1 93.7 20.4 16.6 14.0 15.5 40.9 25.0 17.7 14.2
overall relative hc average 22.3 91.8 31.4 27.1 22.2 18.5 37.4 29.7 24.2 22.0
Notes: * Not in Schoellman (2012) sample.
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